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Centralized control is a fundamental tenet of joint airpower doctrine, yet there are
operational situations in which some degree of decentralization may be appropriate. The
purpose of this research was to quantitatively assess the impacts of decentralizing the
command and control (C2) of airpower under varying operational conditions. The
research used the experimental method to test hypotheses regarding decentralization of
control. JAEX, a stochastic, attrition-based Blue-versus-Red wargaming model,
generated the required data.
The mean difference between JAEX outcomes under centralized control and
outcomes under decentralized control constituted the dependent variable for each
experiment. The independent variables were the operational condition and the scenario
complexity. Three operational conditions were assessed under both an uncontested
scenario and a contested scenario in which Red was equipped with fighter and surface-toair missile defenses.
The first operational condition increasingly imposed range limitations on Blue
aircraft, limiting their ability to attack Red targets in other than their assigned sectors. In
this experiment, the initial Blue centralized C2 advantage, ranging from 20% to 40%
depending on scenario complexity, dropped to nil when Blue aircraft were unable to
iv

range all Red target sectors. Thus, centralized control’s advantage of using Blue aircraft
to attack the highest-priority Red targets was negated when Blue aircraft could not reach
targets outside their assigned sector.
The second operational condition was assessed in two related experiments: one
that increased the numbers of Blue aircraft, and one that increased their capabilities. For
the experiment in which asset numbers were increased, the initial Blue centralized C2
advantage, ranging from 50% to 60%, dropped to nil when the Blue inventory was
doubled. For the experiment in which Blue asset capability was increased, the initial
Blue centralized C2 advantage, ranging from 50% to 110%, dropped to nil when the
modeled capability of Blue aircraft was increased from low to high quality. Thus, the
advantage provided by centralized control in managing scarce or lower-capability assets
was negated as the number or quality of Blue assets in each sector was increased.
The third operational condition increasingly degraded the Blue centralized C2
node, reducing its ability to coherently execute centralized control. The initial centralized
C2 advantage, ranging from 40% to 80%, dropped to -20% (indicating Red advantage)
when the Blue C2 node was severely degraded. Thus, the severely degraded Blue
centralized C2 node generated less effective airpower than the combined airpower
generated by the three decentralized C2 nodes.
The results of this research contribute quantitative insights into the relationships
between the operational conditions of interest and the mean difference between outcomes
under centralized control and decentralized control. The results of this study can provide
input into the myriad factors that commanders consider when designing C2 structures. In
addition, the experimental framework can serve as a template for deeper analyses into the
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topic of decentralizing command and control of airpower. Finally, the research
methodology and model could be adapted to provide a tool for professional military
education, enabling practitioners to gain a deeper understanding of the impacts of
decentralizing airpower C2.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Any large organization faces a basic dilemma between centralization and
decentralization” (Harford, 2011, p. 80).
The tenet of centralized control, decentralized execution is a fundamental
principle of the command and control (C2) of joint airpower (Joint Publication 3-30,
2014a). Under U.S. doctrine, a joint force is composed of elements from two or more of
the three military departments: Army, Navy, and Air Force (Joint Publication 3-0, 2017,
p. GL-11). The research discussed herein focuses on the control part of this foundational
tenet, exploring the conditions under which long-range airpower assets can be better
directed in combat through centralized or decentralized C2 systems. Accordingly, this
study examines the operational conditions of geographic distance between target sectors,
the number and capabilities of air assets, and the capabilities of the C2 systems, in
assessing the impacts of decentralizing airpower C2.
This foundational concept of centralized control has been a source of significant
inter-service debate since the dawn of aviation (Fedorchak, 1995, p. 79; Whitlow, 1994,
p. 69). The concept has strong historical roots dating back to the early uses of airpower
in World War I and is now ensconced in both Air Force service doctrine (U.S. Air Force,
2015b) and in joint service doctrine (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014a) subscribed to by all
four military services. Airmen have long argued in favor of centralized control of
airpower, convinced that this allows commanders to concentrate the limited supply of
airpower against the highest priority missions. Airmen tend to associate discussions of
decentralized control with dividing up airpower capabilities and assigning them to direct
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support of individual ground combat units. Such arrangements, derisively termed “penny
packets” by the Royal Air Force’s Air Marshal Arthur Tedder (1946), are viewed by
many airmen as suboptimum and wasteful (Rife, 1999, p. 73; Santicola, 2005, p. 4). This
research will include discussions of decentralization control arrangements that do not
carry the negative connotations associated with the direct assignment of airpower assets
to ground combat units.
There is a host of trade-offs between the alternatives of centralized control and
decentralized control (Hinote, 2009). The tension between the alternatives is at the heart
of this proposed research; the intent is to analyze how various operational conditions
affect decentralization’s impact on airpower effectiveness.
While this study focuses on the military applications of centralized command and
control, its relevance extends into other military and civilian realms. Non-military
applications include balancing the authorities of the federal government versus those of
the individual states, those of a university versus individual colleges, and those of the
headquarters of a large corporation versus the regional and local offices, to note only a
few of many possible additional examples (Morgan, 1993). Morgan (1997) suggests that
while highly centralized systems may be appropriate for “firms that are ‘production
driven’ or ‘efficiency driven,’ they are inappropriate for firms that are ‘market driven’”
(p. 50). He notes the “necessity of reconciling the contrary requirements of centralization
and decentralization to preserve an appropriate flexibility in different parts of large
organizations” (p. 21). This study develops a methodology that could be useful in
assessing tradeoffs between centralization and decentralization in non-military
organizations.

3
U.S. Airpower Command and Control in Theory
The appropriate degree of centralization of control has long been a source of
contention between the various armed services. Early leaders of the Army Air Forces
and the British Royal Air Force argued strenuously for central control of airpower by a
senior airman, while commanders of Army and Navy forces preferred a more
decentralized approach, in which ground and naval tactical units had control of air
support (Baltrusaitis, 2004, p. 9-10). This tension remains, although today the principle
of centralized control, decentralized execution is generally accepted and is outlined in
both joint and Air Force doctrine (Joint Publication 3-30; AF Doctrine Annex 3-30). For
U.S. joint forces, the Air Operations Center (AOC) is the hub for centralized control of
joint air operations, serving as the senior element in the Theater Air Control System
(TACS). The AOC is responsible for the planning, synchronization, and integration of
the theater air operation.
Several military analysts have pointed out, however, that individual and
institutional interpretations of command and control can vary with time, place, and
motivation. The terms themselves can be subject to ambiguous and conflicting
interpretations. Despite military doctrine being generally precise in definition of terms
and concepts, the terms command and control are occasionally used interchangeably in
doctrine (Ankerstar, 2015, p. 11). Cooling (1994) notes that
These terms are so often glibly linked that they are easily assumed to be
synonymous. Command is the obligation to make decisions, to give orders, to
direct. Control, by contrast, is the process by which command is exercised; this
involves the whole series of steps by which orders are communicated and the
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feedback on performance is monitored. Inexorably this involves the whole
spectrum of communications, the technical terminology employed, the semantic
adequacy of the message passed, and the means of communications used. (p.
620)
Alberts and Hayes (2003) provided a useful analogy to explain the difference
between command and control. Many homes have a thermostat with which the occupants
can command a temperature for the heating and air conditioning system to maintain. The
thermostat controls the equipment (compressors, heating coils, and air handlers) to attain
the desired temperature. In military operations, commands are directives issued by
authorized personnel; control includes the process and mechanisms for carrying out the
commands.
Joint doctrine, the codification of fundamental beliefs gained through experience
and exercises, includes definitions and descriptions of C2 constructs. Centralized control
of joint air operations is defined as placing within one commander the responsibility and
authority for planning, directing, and coordinating air operations (Joint Publication 3-30,
2014a, p. GL-6). Through decentralized execution, the tactical execution authorities are
delegated to lower-level commanders (such as mission commanders or on-scene
commanders), who often will have a better comprehension of the tactical execution
details than those occupants of distant command centers. Of note, the term decentralized
control is not defined in doctrine in the context of command and control, but for the
purposes of this study, decentralization will involve delegating C2 functions to lowerlevel commanders rather than being exercised from a centralized control node.
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According to current joint doctrine, the overall Joint Force Commander (JFC) can
conduct operations either through service component commanders or through functional
component commanders (Joint Operations, 2017, p. IV-6). Figure 1 depicts an
organizational structure for a joint force commander that includes both service and
functional component commands.

Figure 1. Possible components in a joint force. Adapted from Joint Doctrine Publication
1 (2017), Figure IV-1. Used with permission.
Should JFCs choose to conduct operations through their service component
commands, the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Special Operations forces would
conduct operations under their respective service component commanders, each
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supporting the overall joint campaign. As will be discussed in more detail in the next
chapter, the military services have a history of fighting independently, deconflicting their
operations rather than integrating them. For example, during WWII, national military
commanders geographically deconflicted the Navy’s thrust toward Japan in the Central
Pacific under Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur’s island-hopping push toward
Japan in the South West Pacific Area by assigning distinct operational boundaries to
each. This scenario provides an example of decentralized air operations using service
components, in which the naval air forces supporting naval operations and land-based air
forces under General Kenney supported General MacArthur’s land and amphibious
forces. Considerable friction was evident with the two forces operating in close
proximity to each other (Griffith, 1998, p. 119-121).
When forces from two or more services operate in the same domain, the JFC can
conduct operations using functional components (Joint Operations, 2017, p. IV-7). For
the function of joint airpower, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
exercises control over air forces (from multiple military services and coalition countries)
assigned or attached to them for tasking, as depicted in Figure 2. Thus, the JFACC can
oversee joint employment of Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and coalition aircraft, rather
than have them operate exclusively in support of their own service components.

7

Figure 2. Notional Joint Force Air Component Commander authorities. Adapted from
“Air Component Command” PowerPoint presentation, 505 Command & Control Wing,
2017. Used with permission.
Although this construct may extract the maximum effectiveness from the
combined capabilities provided by the services, it also is often a source of friction
between the services. Per joint doctrine, the JFACC responsibilities should be assigned
to the “component commander having the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the
ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations” (Joint Publication 3-30,
2014a, p. ix). Thus, a JFACC, who may be an Air Force officer, can execute joint air
operations using a combined force consisting of Air Force forces and those from other
military services and other countries, to provide unity of effort in air operations.
U.S. Airpower Command and Control in Current Practice
In practice, the command and control of theater air operations has proven to be a
complex undertaking, requiring interactions between command nodes and warfighters
connected by communication links. Figures 3 and 4 provide a sense of the complexities
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and the required connectivity with a significant number of entities associated with
planning, tasking, executing, and assessing joint air operations. Figure 3 depicts control
nodes associated with the Theater Air Control System (TACS), the air component’s
network for planning and executing air operations. This system comprises a variety of
components linked together to exercise command and control of airpower. Under the
principle of centralized control, the designated JFACC exercises command and control of
the full spectrum of air operations, including exploitation of space and cyber capabilities,
from an AOC.

Figure 3. Theater Air Control System depiction. Adapted from “Air Component
Command” PowerPoint presentation, 505 Command & Control Wing, 2017, slide 18.
Used with permission.
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Figure 4. Theater Air Ground System (TAGS). This figure shows the complexity of
integrating multi-component C2 systems. Adapted from “Air Component Command”
PowerPoint presentation, by 505 Command & Control Wing, 2017, slide 18. Used with
permission.
Per joint doctrine, the AOC is “the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes
personnel and equipment of necessary disciplines to ensure the effective planning and
conduct of component air and space operations (e.g., communications, operations, ISR)”
(Joint Publication 3-30, 2014a, p. II-8). The typical AOC comprises a support staff and
five interconnected divisions:


Strategy Division



Combat Plans Division



Combat Operations Division



Air Mobility Division



Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division
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The AOC is the senior C2 element in the Theater Air Control System depicted in
Figure 3. For a detailed discussion of how a large-scale AOC operates in practice, see,
for example, Lambeth (2013, pp. 207-220), which describes the operation of the CAOC
located at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, prior to and during Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003. Subordinate, distributed Air Force-provided control nodes may
include one or more Control and Reporting Centers (CRC), Air Support Operations
Centers (ASOC), Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS), and Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP), which
are generally focused on execution rather than planning. The Control and Reporting
Centers manage the airspace and coordinate intercepts of unknown and hostile aircraft;
the AWACS is essentially an airborne version of the CRC. The JSTARS carries a radar
sensor that can track moving vehicles and can perform airborne C2 functions. The
ASOC operates in conjunction with ground forces, coordinating Close Air Support attack
missions and other air support. The TACPs operate alongside ground forces, providing
close and detailed integration of air support when required by the ground commander.
The preceding discussion describes the C2 structure erected by the Air Force
component; each military service brings its own C2 and communications architecture to
the operating area. The combined architecture is referred to as the Theater Air Ground
System (TAGS), depicted in Figure 4. Each military service’s network is optimized to
enable it to effectively command and control its own air assets (also known as organic
assets) to support its assigned missions in the joint battlespace, which is a threedimensional version of the traditional two-dimensional battlefield.
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The Joint Force Air Component Commander’s AOC, responsible for planning,
tasking, executing, and assessing theater air operations, must be able to effectively
integrate each of these individual systems. This effective integration of these systems
requires extensive information technology and communications requirements, creating
both advantages for U.S. forces but also potential vulnerabilities, as will be discussed
subsequently. The overall joint force commander (JFC), for whom the JFACC works,
may assign the JFACC the missions of air superiority, strategic attack, theater airlift,
coordination of combat search and rescue, interdiction, close air support, airspace control,
area air defense, and integration of space capabilities.
For Operations Desert Shield and Storm, the overall commander, General H.
Norman Schwarzkopf, designated the Air Force component commander, then-Lieutenant
General Charles Horner, to be the Joint Force Air Component Commander (Clancy &
Horner, 1999). Horner planned, tasked, and executed air operations with his Air Force
forces, plus air assets provided by other services and coalition partners (Olsen, 2010, p.
197). Some tension remained, however, as various air assets remained under control of
their respective component commanders to meet their own requirements (Gordon &
Trainor, 1995, p. 310-31). For example, the Army component retained control of its
attack helicopters and transport aircraft, the Navy retained aircraft for transport and
defense of its fleet, and the Marines retained control of much of its ground attack and air
mobility fleet. As Winnefeld and Johnson (1993) noted, sufficient resources from the
services were committed to Desert Storm to allow planners to avoid making fundamental
choices, and “resolution of the argument has been postponed to another day when
scarcity, not abundance, will define the rules of the game” (p. 133).
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Airpower advocates have historically expressed resistance to decentralized
control, concerned that assigning air assets to subordinate commanders, each with their
narrow view of the overall problem posed by the adversary, will sub-optimize airpower’s
effectiveness (Santicola, 2005, p. 4). After all, a lower-level commander faced with a
difficult mission is unlikely to voluntarily yield air assets to a neighboring commander
facing a greater threat, even if doing so would be to the benefit of the overall
organization. With centralized control, the pooled assets can be apportioned to the
greatest need, as determined by the overall joint force commander. Yet many
commanders of ground or naval forces see centralization of airpower under control of a
single airman as inhibiting responsiveness to their needs. As Fedorchak (1995) noted,
The sea and ground services want airpower to operate under their control in direct
support of the tactical and operational levels of their respective campaigns, while
the Air Force wants to focus its assets on an independent air campaign against
strategic targets in support of the theater campaign. (p. 79)
Although naval aviation can perform many of the same functions as the platforms
in the Air Force, the Navy’s air arm is generally focused on supporting its assigned
missions by conducting five maritime-related functions: all-domain access, deterrence,
sea control, power projection, and maritime security (U.S. Navy, 2015b, p. 19). In
contrast to the Air Force fundamental C2 tenet of centralized control, the Navy has long
had a culture of operational freedom. For most of its history, naval fleets operated under
a philosophy of decentralized command out of necessity due to inability to communicate
with ships once they had disappeared over the horizon (Donnithorne, 2018, p. 50). Navy
doctrine specifies that “senior maritime commanders still exercise decentralized
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command, albeit using a much-enhanced awareness of the operational environment”
(U.S. Navy, 2010, p. 1-2).
The Marine Corps also poses a dilemma for airpower centralization, as their
effectiveness relies on seamless integration of land and air combat capabilities. When
deployed for operations, leaders of Marine Corps forces insist on operating as an integral
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) (Becker, 1988). The issue of control of
Marine aviation during sustained operations ashore has arisen on a regular basis since the
advent of airpower (Murrow & Bray, 1990, p. iii). The Marines argue that they lack the
organic firepower of Army units (particularly artillery and heavy tanks) and rely heavily
on their air arm (including FA-18, AV-8, and now F-35B and C aircraft) for dedicated
support of their ground units.
Similarly, special operations forces (SOF), operating as a Joint Special Operations
Task Force (JSOTF), are comprised as a cohesive joint team, generally with specialized
equipment and training. The Special Operations component operates its air assets under
its own Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) (Joint Publication 3-05,
2014b, p. III-10). Special operations air forces have had, at times, a contentious
relationship with conventional air forces, even having been described as “dedicated and
capable warriors who don't work well with others” (Schenberger, 2001, p. 3). Special
Operations air commanders generally retain control of their dedicated air assets
(including gunships, specialized ISR platforms, specially equipped transports, and air
refueling aircraft) rather than participate in a joint pool of airpower. The rationale for this
decentralized approach to airpower centers on their requirement for air-ground teaming,
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the importance of personal relationships, and the need for secrecy due to the sensitive
nature of special operations forces activities (Haberichter, 2004, pp. 27-30).
Despite these caveats, the concept of centralized control of airpower, executed by
the JFACC, has proven to be effective in recent operations in coordinating modern air
operations while mitigating the concerns of other services and special operations forces.
In the past three decades, the air forces of the U.S. and its allies have conducted centrallycontrolled air operations that successfully achieved the objectives set for them in Desert
Storm (Iraq, 1992), Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan,
2001), Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003) and Unified Protector (Libya, 2011) (Brown, 2013;
Fought, 2004; Lambeth, 2001; Lambeth 2005; Lambeth 2013; Laslie, 2015; Phinney,
2014). Yet past performance is not a guarantee of future success, and there are reasons to
worry about the resiliency of the centralized airpower command and control arrangement
in future conflicts.
Resiliency Challenges
The operations mentioned previously were centrally controlled from CAOCs
located in relatively low-threat areas. As noted in the Air Force’s own doctrine, “our
combat experience of the last two decades has been characterized by centralization of
authority at the highest possible level in an essentially benign, uncontested air
environment.” This statement is followed by a warning of the potential for being lulled
into complacency regarding relying on secure, unchallenged C2 (Annex 3-30, 2015, p. 4).
In none of the earlier conflicts was the adversary capable of effectively disrupting
the JFACC’s C2 apparatus; in future conflicts, however, U.S. air commanders are likely
to see their C2 capabilities degraded by capable adversaries (Hostage & Broadwell,
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2014). U.S. forces have grown accustomed to operating from C2 safe havens, with
unfettered access to communications networks. Future conflicts may not provide the
luxury of unopposed C2. An attack on the central decision-making node could debilitate
the planning, tasking, execution, and assessment cycle upon which effective airpower
employment relies (Joint Publication 3-30, 2014, p. III-20). Sophisticated adversaries,
having read U.S. public doctrine and witnessed the capabilities delivered by highly
integrated, centrally controlled air operations, can be expected to attack the C2 structure,
just as the U.S. and its allies effectively attacked C2 structures of its adversaries in recent
conflicts, including Syria (Kaplan, 2016) and Iraq (Lambeth 2013). Future adversaries
will recognize the potential Achilles’ heel associated with placing a significant degree of
C2 capability in a single node and will likely devote considerable effort to destroying or
disrupting friendly C2 networks (see, for example, Liang & Xiangsui, 1999).
The advantages provided by centrally planning, synchronizing, and integrating the
air effort could become a liability if the central node is incapacitated. Hostage and
Broadwell (2014) state, “the resiliency of our networks, datalinks, and communications
will almost certainly be contested” (p. 38). Determined and capable adversaries would
actively work to counter the asymmetric advantage provided by our use of a robust
interconnected network, through C2 warfare. C2 warfare is about “cutting off an enemy
force from its commander, key decision makers, or automated control systems through
attacking vulnerable control mechanisms” (McGrath, 2017, p. 18). CAOCs of the future
may come under physical attack, or adversaries could use attacks through cyberspace or
the electromagnetic spectrum to disrupt the centralized C2 mechanism.
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Significance of the Study
The study is intended to provide quantitative insights into the impacts of
decentralizing C2 under three different operational conditions: range limitations on Blue
assets, increasing the quantity or capability of Blue assets, or a reduction in Blue
centralized C2 capability. The study presumed a two-sided Blue (friendly forces) versus
Red (adversary forces) conflict. Each operational condition was analyzed under two
scenarios of increasing complexity.
In general, the degree of decentralization of airpower C2 is driven by the overall
commander’s assessment of the most effective way to employ joint forces (Joint
Publication 1, 2017, Chapter V). However, some degree of decentralization could be
forced by the effects of C2 warfare, in which attacks on C2 nodes could reduce the
ability of the centralized nodes to effectively orchestrate operations. The degree of
centralization of airpower command and control has significant operational
consequences, yet, as Kometer (2007) notes, there is relatively little research on the
topic in the scholarly literature (p. 7). The results of this study will provide quantitative
insights into considerations regarding centralization and decentralization of airpower C2
in future conflicts.
The joint force commander, with input from the staff and subordinate
commanders, implements an appropriate airpower command and control structure from
a menu of options (Joint Publication 3-30, 2014, p. ix). Control of airpower assets could
be at the theater level, at the joint task force level, at the service component level,
through empowerment of lower-level commanders, or some combination of the above.
For example, as will be discussed subsequently, in 2001, the Central Command
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leadership initially elected to retain a theater-level air component rather than provide
separate, decentralized air components for commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
arrangement evolved over time, with some elements of control eventually decentralized
below the theater level (Hukill et al., 2012).
This study is intended to add to the body of knowledge that commanders rely on,
augmented by personal experience and understanding of the situation, when determining
appropriate airpower C2 arrangements. As described below, the present research
employs three Blue sectors, with a single Blue base in each sector, and a specific
inventory of assets, to provide a baseline of results and demonstrate the feasibility of the
methodology. However, the methodology and results would be generalizable across
different number of sectors, different inventory of assets, and different target sets. Each
Blue base is representative of a cluster of bases, and each Red target is representative of a
larger target array. An example of applying this methodology to a larger, more complex
scenario is discussed in Chapter V.
The results of this study will provide input into the many factors that commanders
consider when designing C2 structures. Such structures invariably involve decisions
regarding the appropriate level of centralization, which may be different for different
types of missions or assets. In addition, the methodology used in this research, in which
outcomes under centralized control are contrasted with outcomes under decentralized
control for the same starting conditions, can provide a framework for further assessments
of the impact of decentralizing airpower C2.
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Statement of the Problem
This research addresses the problem of quantitatively assessing the impacts of
decentralizing airpower C2 while changing three specific operational conditions:
imposing Blue air asset range limits, increasing the number or capability of Blue assets,
and degrading the Blue centralized C2 node’s capability to orchestrate operations. As
discussed in Chapter II, the literature is replete with assertions both in support of
centralized control of airpower’s limited supply or in support of decentralizing control to
the edge of the battlespace. The decision to centralize or decentralize various aspects of
the C2 apparatus of the joint force in an operation would generally be made by the
commanders involved, but it could be impacted through the adversary’s employment of
C2 warfare. This study will attempt to quantify the impact on airpower’s effectiveness of
decentralizing control, under the operational conditions mentioned above.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this research effort is to quantitatively assess the impacts of
decentralizing the command and control of airpower while varying these three
operational conditions:
 Range limitations on Blue air assets that restrict their capability to operate
across all geographic sectors (equivalently, increasing the distance between
sectors of operations).
 The quantity or capability of Blue assets available for tasking.
 The capability of the Blue centralized C2 node to effectively control air
operations.
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For the purposes of the experiment, the Blue centralized C2 node, representing the
AOC, could control assets from any of the airfields and strike any of the depicted Red
targets (including airfields, interdiction targets, and strategic attack targets). In a
decentralized mode, the three decentralized C2 nodes could only control strike assets
based in their respective sector and could only strike targets in the same sector on the Red
side. In all cases, the Red side used decentralized control (the Red air assets could only
be used in the sector in which they were based).

Figure 5. Notional Blue vs. Red battlespace. This diagram formed the basis for how the
study compared centralized and decentralized control as the operational conditions were
varied under two scenarios of different complexity.

The first operational condition imposed range restrictions on Blue airpower assets
that limit their geographic area of influence. This range limitation reduced the ability of
the centralized node to direct assets from one region to another, even if another sector’s
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targets were of higher priority. Inversely, if the geographic distance between sectors
were reduced (or the aircraft ranges were extended through use of longer-range assets,
aerial refueling, or intermediate staging locations), centralization should yield increased
effectiveness, since assets in one sector can be used to meet higher-priority needs across
the entire battlespace.
Under the second operational condition, which was divided into two analyses, the
quantity and capability of the Blue asset inventory was increased. As the overall quantity
or capability of Blue assets increases, each sector should become more self-sufficient.
Thus, it might be expected that the efficiencies exerted by centralization would diminish
as the total number of assets increases. Inversely, if the number or capabilities of assets
were decreased, each asset is in greater demand, and centralized C2 would be expected to
better facilitate matching these limited assets against the highest priority needs. Although
increasing the number of assets was expected to have roughly the same effect as
increasing their capability while holding the number constant, both conditions were
subject to experimentation.
Under the third operational condition, the centralized C2 node experienced a
capability degradation, affecting its ability to effectively orchestrate air operations across
the theater. During a conflict, a fully functional AOC could have its ability to conduct air
operations severely impacted, at least temporarily, as a consequence of C2 warfare
(Freedberg, 2017). The net effect of reducing the centralized node’s capacity would be to
make the decentralized nodes more effective relative to the debilitated centralized node.
Since each component commander brings the capability to command and control the
forces over which he or she exerts operational command (Joint Publication 3-0, 2017, p.
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IV-7), their decentralized C2 nodes will have significant capability to orchestrate
operations within a limited sector (for example, SOF, Marine, or naval fleet C2). The
research study assessed the impact of decentralization when the centralized node was
operating at a reduced capacity while the decentralized nodes retained full capability.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
From the preceding discussion, the key research question arises: from a baseline
of centralized C2, what is the impact on airpower effectiveness when airpower C2 is
decentralized, and how is this difference between the two types of C2 impacted by
changes in one of three operational conditions: the geographic range of Blue assets, the
quantity or capability of Blue assets, or the capability of the Blue centralized C2 node?
Each of the operational conditions generated a specific research question, discussed
below.
Geographic range of assets. The first specific research question addressed is:
what is the effect on the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and
outcomes under decentralized control when a greater proportion of Blue assets is rangelimited (i.e., restricted to the geographic sector in which they are based)? This condition
can arise as a result of the type of asset employed, as some aircraft, depending on their
airspeed limits or fuel capacity, are impractical to operate at long ranges. This condition
can also arise as a result of long distances between operational sectors, since at some
point the neighboring sectors will be beyond the unrefueled range of its aircraft. In either
case, this situation has the effect of limiting the ability of the centralized C2 system to
shift the air effort to other sectors; the first hypothesis of this study is that the mean
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
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control will decrease as a greater proportion of its assets is range-restricted. In the
extreme, if no assets can operate outside the sector in which they are based, there should
be minimal difference between airpower effectiveness under centralized and
decentralized control. The associated alternate hypothesis and null hypothesis are:
H1: As the proportion of Blue assets that can operate outside their assigned sector
decreases, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control decreases.
H10: As the proportion of assets that can operate outside their assigned sector
decreases, there is no significant change in the mean difference between outcomes under
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control.
Overall quantity and capability of assets. The second specific research
question to be addressed is divided into two subparts:
Quantity of Blue assets. What is the effect on mean difference between outcomes
under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control when the quantity of
Blue assets is increased? The associated hypothesis is that increasing Blue’s quantity of
assets can offset the impact of decentralizing command and control. In other words, as
the quantity or capability of Blue assets increases, any efficiency advantage of
centralization could be reduced. The associated alternate hypothesis and null hypothesis
are:
H2a: As the quantity of Blue assets is increased, the mean difference between
outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control decreases.
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H2a0: As the quantity of Blue assets is increased, there is no significant change in
the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under
decentralized control.
Capability of Blue assets. What is the effect on the mean difference between
outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control when the
capability of Blue assets is increased? The associated hypothesis is that increasing Blue’s
asset capability can offset the impact of decentralizing command and control. In other
words, as the capability of Blue assets increases, the efficiency advantage of
centralization could be reduced. The associated alternate hypothesis and null hypothesis
are:
H2b: As the capability of Blue assets is increased, the mean difference between
outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control decreases.
H2b0: As the capability of Blue assets is increased, there is no significant change
in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under
decentralized control.
Degradation of the centralized C2 node. The third specific research question to
be addressed is: what is the effect on the mean difference between outcomes under
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control when the Blue centralized
C2 node becomes degraded, either by adversary action or natural causes? The associated
hypothesis is that degradations in Blue’s centralized C2 capability will neutralize
advantages it may initially demonstrate compared to a decentralized mode of command
and control.
The associated alternate hypothesis and null hypothesis are:
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H3: As the Blue centralized node becomes increasingly degraded, the mean
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
control decreases.
H30: As the centralized node becomes increasingly degraded, there is no
significant change in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control
and outcomes under decentralized control.
Research Approach
The research used the experimental method to test the previously outlined
hypotheses regarding decentralization of control. A wargaming model known as Joint
Air Exercise (JAEX) generated the data required for the analysis. JAEX is a stochastic,
hexagon-based, operational-level wargame that runs on networked personal computers.
JAEX is currently being employed for studies sponsored by the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research, and the model is used in educational modules at the Air Command
and Staff College (Tiller, 2017a, p. 1). The model’s engine is also used in Modern
Airpower, adapted for use by the Air Force’s Squadron Officer School as an educational
tool for company-grade officers (Caffrey, 2019, p. 310). The JAEX model engine has
been used in several previously published studies, including Tiller (2017a and 2017b);
House, Tiller, and Rushing (2016); Tiller and Cavagnaro (2015); and Rushing, Tanner,
and Tiller, (2015). The model’s engine is the same used in several popular commercial
wargames, including War Over the Mideast and War Over Vietnam (Tiller, 2019). JAEX
is described further at Appendix A.
Using the stochastic JAEX model, an air operation plan can be executed hundreds
of times to obtain a distribution of results for that scenario. For the present research, the
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experiments were conducted under Blue centralized control and then under decentralized
control; the resulting mean outcome difference constituted the dependent variable in the
experiment. The outcome differences were compared as the independent variables, the
operational conditions and scenario complexities, were varied. The specifics of these
comparisons are described in more detail in Chapter III of the study.
Models and Wargames
This study employed a computerized wargame model to generate data for
analysis. Computer models are mathematical representations of reality, while simulations
are representations of reality over time (Caffrey, 2000, p. 34). Wargames are simulations
of military operations involving opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures
designed to replicate a real-life situation; wargames are doctrinally described as
“representations of conflict in a synthetic environment” (Joint Publication 5-0, 2017b,
p. V-31).
Some military professionals have expressed unease when their tradecraft is
subjected to numerical analysis; Clausewitz (in Paret’s 1976 translation) argued that
knowledge about warfare “cannot be forcibly produced by an apparatus of scientific
formulas and mechanics” (p. 146). He flatly stated that “it is not possible to construct a
model of the art of war…” (p. 140). The noted strategist Julian Corbett (1911) observed
in the introduction of his classic book on maritime strategy,
The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of character, of common
sense, of rapid decision upon complex and ever-shifting factors, and those factors
themselves are so varied, so intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and
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physical conditions, that it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true
scientific analysis. (p. 1)
Yet not all military strategists are in agreement with Clausewitz and Corbett
regarding the utility of using models for analysis. The famed strategist Jomini argued in
the early 19th century that “all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles”
(Shy, 1986, 146). More recently the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense noted that
“wargames can make the difference between wise and unwise investment trajectories and
make our forces more successful in future conflicts” (p. 12). This research is based on
the premise that wargames can provide useful insights, if not precise answers. Past
wargames have proven successful in testing the types of hypotheses analyzed in this
research, regarding distances, numbers, and capabilities (Caffrey, 2019, pp. 277-289).
Wargames generally involve opposition driven by a thinking enemy and can
range from very simple table-top simulations to very complex computerized replications
of operational environments. Wargaming has long been recognized as an important
technique in planning, professional education, and research. Research using wargames
can involve both qualitative and quantitative methodologies (Hämäläinen, Sormunen,
Rantapelkonen, & Nikkarila, 2014). In both wargames and war, chance plays a role.
Each play of a wargame represents one pass through a series of probabilistic events.
Computerized wargames allow multiple plays much faster than real time, enabling the
construction of a histogram of outcomes, as shown in Figure 6.

27

Figure 6. Notional histogram of outcomes. This figure reflects normally distributed
outcomes from a wargaming model. From Caffrey (2008), slide 32. Used with
permission.

As Caffrey (2008) noted, conflicts also have many possible outcomes, with the
actual outcome of a conflict drawn from this distribution of possible outcomes. In both
wargames and war, chance plays a role. Unlike wargames, actual conflicts are not refought multiple times, but if they were, Caffrey argued the distribution of outcomes
would likely be comparable to the distribution of wargame outcomes, as shown in Figure
7. The histogram of wargame outcomes in Figure 7 is depicted as being offset from the
histogram of outcomes that would be obtained by re-fighting a conflict repeatedly. This
study proceeds on the assumption, supported by Caffrey (interview, October 10, 2018),
that the relative differences in outcomes using a wargame model evaluated under two
different conditions can provide insights into the relative differences that would be
obtained in the real world when fought under the same conditions.
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Figure 7. Comparison of notional histograms. If same conflict were to be replicated
(with each outcome independent of the others), the distribution would conceivably be
normally distributed, as is the distribution of the wargame results. The two distributions,
however, may not center on the same mean nor have the same variance. From Caffrey
(2008), slide 37. Used with permission.
Delimitations
Because of the complexity of modeling theater air operations, the study sets
several delimitations to keep the scope of the study at a manageable level. A theater air
component commander would orchestrate the planning, tasking, execution, and
assessment of a wide range of multi-domain operations (Saltzman, 2018; see also Harris,
2018). To keep the number of variables manageable, this study will be limited to
examining the effect of decentralizing control on a pertinent subset of these missions.
The study restricts itself to analysis of airpower operations associated with strikes
against fixed targets in the adversary’s rear area. This mission set has been a key area of
historic tension between centralization and decentralization of airpower C2 in past
conflicts, including World War II (Atkinson, 2002; Momyer, 1994), the Vietnam War
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(Michel, 2002; Momyer 1994; Tilford 1991), the Korean War (Momyer), the first Gulf
War (Clancy, 1999), and the most recent conflict in Iraq (Lambeth, 2013).
The menu below depicts the full spectrum of multi-domain missions overseen at a
typical CAOC. The present research focuses on a subset of these missions, generally
corresponding to Clodfelter’s (1989) categorization of direct, independent airpower:
those missions that involve the lethal application of force intended to achieve objectives
apart from those pursued by ground or naval forces at a particular location (p. 213). The
types of missions studied in the present research are highlighted in bold.


Defensive Counterair, including combat air patrols and surface-to-air
missile operations



Offensive Counterair, including attacks on adversary airfields, fighter
sweeps, fighter escorts, suppression of enemy air defenses, and attacks
on adversary C2 links and nodes



Air mobility operations, including intra-theater and inter-theater
movement of personnel and cargo), aerial refueling, and aeromedical
evacuation



Oversight of the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, and execution of
Combat Search and Rescue operations



Collection operations management of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions



Land attack operations, including Close Air Support, Interdiction, and
Strategic Attack missions
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Space Operations, including defensive measure to protect access to space,
and offensive actions to impede adversary use of space



Cyber Operations, including offensive and defensive cyber measures

Typically, wargames have active human players in the roles of Blue and Red
forces. While using the human players adds an element of realism, it also introduces
confounding variables; another key delimitation of this study is that actions on each side
were guided by the model’s algorithms rather than active human play, discussed further
in the assumptions section, below.
Another delimitation of the study was that the cost of the various decentralized C2
options is not included as a measure of efficiency or effectiveness. C2 nodes require
equipment and trained personnel, both of which impose costs on military forces. The
incremental cost of the decentralized C2 options would be highly dependent on the
circumstances, since many of the decentralized C2 capabilities are currently inherent in
component-level operations. For example, SOF, Marine, and naval forces already bring
their own C2 apparatus to the theater of operations, so there would be minimal
incremental resources required. Another decentralization option would be for the air
component commander to use the operations centers of deployed combat wings as
decentralized C2 nodes. These wing operations centers (WOCs) are normally staffed
only to conduct the logistics and operational execution activities needed to launch and
recover the wing's own aircraft to meet assigned taskings and do not exercise control of
ongoing operations. To serve as a decentralized C2 node, the WOCs would have to
expand their limited complements of planning and control personnel and their

31
communications and data linkages. This study is not intended to identify a preferred
decentralized mode and will not include costs of decentralized C2 modes in the analysis.
Limitations and Assumptions
Wargames are valuable in generating questions to be asked but should not to be
taken as the absolute answer to a situation (Ross, 2008, p. 5). A key assumption of this
research was that the wargaming methodology would provide relative insights that are
transferable to real-world applications, as described earlier in this chapter. Relative
differences in outcomes using a wargame model evaluated under two different conditions
should approximate the relative differences that would be obtained in the real world when
fought under the same two different conditions.
As previously mentioned, in place of active human players for the Blue and Red
sides in the experiments, the model’s developers made several assumptions in the
programming of the model’s algorithms. Blue aircraft were programmed to attack the
highest priority targets within range. Half of the Blue airborne defensive counterair
(DCA) combat air patrols in other sectors were permitted to be used under centralized
control to defend against a Red attack in another sector, while the others defended their
home sector. Finally, the Red strike aircraft were programmed to attack Blue airfields
rather than attacking the Blue C2 nodes (Tiller, interview, August 6, 2018).
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Definitions of Terms
Centralized control

In joint air operations, placing within one
commander the responsibility and authority for
planning, directing, and coordinating a military
operation or group/category of operations (JP 3-30,
p. GL-6).

Command

The authority that a commander in the armed forces
lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of
rank or assignment (JP 1, 2017, p. 41).

Command and Control

The exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the
mission (JP 1, 2017, p. 41).

Control

Authority that may be less than full command
exercised by a commander over part of the activities
of subordinate or other organizations (JP 1, 2017, p.
50).

Decentralized Control

In joint air operations, delegating to a subordinate
commander the responsibility and authority for
planning, directing, and coordinating a military
operation or group/category of operations (not
defined in joint doctrine).
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Decentralized execution

Delegation of execution authority to subordinate
commanders (JP 3-30, p. GL-6).

List of Acronyms
AETF

Air expeditionary task force

AOC

Air Operations Center

ANOVA

Analysis of Variance

ASOC

Air Support Operations Center

ATO

Air Tasking Order

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System

BCD

Battlefield Coordination Detachment

C2

Command and Control

CAOC

Combined Air Operations Center

CAS

Close Air Support

CFACC

Combined Force Air Component Commander

CNA

Computer Network Attack

CRC

Control and Reporting Center

DCA

Defensive Counterair

FLOT

Forward Line of Own Troops

ISR

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JAEX

Joint Air Exercise

JFACC

Joint Force Air Component Commander

JFC

Joint Force Commander
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JP

Joint Publication

JSOAC

Joint Special Operations Air Component

JSOTF

Joint Special Operations Task Force

JSTARS

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

MAGTF

Marine Air Ground Task Force

OCA

Offensive Counterair

ROE

Rules of engagement

SAC

Strategic Air Command

SEAD

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SOF

Special Operations Forces

TACP

Tactical Air Control Party

TACS

Theater Air Control System

TAGS

Theater Air-Ground System

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

USAF

U.S. Air Force

USMC

U.S. Marine Corps

USN

U. S. Navy

WOC

Wing Operations Center
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
“You can observe a lot by watching.”
-- Yogi Berra (Berra, 1998, p. 123)
This chapter reviews the literature on subjects relevant to the study of the
effectiveness of airpower under centralized versus decentralized modes of control. The
chapter includes a discussion of pertinent descriptions and history, the tradeoffs involved
between centralization and decentralization of control of joint airpower operations, and a
brief speculation about the future of airpower command and control.
Inherent Tensions between Centralization and Decentralization
Effectively executing command and control requires an understanding of inherent
tensions and balancing the tradeoffs between different organizational and process
arrangements. Centralization versus decentralization represents the key dynamic in these
tradeoffs. Other related tradeoffs include balancing dispersal versus consolidation of
resources, the degree of autonomy versus interdependence, the drive for efficiency versus
effectiveness in applying resources, the push for robustness (being strong against
particular threats) versus flexible resilience (being adaptive and able to adjust against
unforeseen threats), and the balance between quality versus quantity (Lyle, 2018). As
Hinote (2009) pointed out, there are no simple answers; he relates the tradeoffs and
tensions to what Liddell Hart called a duality: “Like a coin, it has two faces … hence the
need for a well-calculated compromise as a means to reconciliation” (p. 1). This
dissertation analyzes some of those compromises. Before discussing factors bearing on
the tradeoffs, the paper will review historical context pertinent to the study.
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Definitional Issues
Many writings on command and control start with attempts to clarify definitions.
As alluded to in the previous chapter, the terms command, control, centralization,
decentralization, and execution all have nuanced definitions that can create confusion and
contribute to miscommunication (Baltrusaitis, 2004, p. 3). A key area of uncertainty with
the terms results from the overlap of control with execution. In fact, in the early 1970s,
official Air Force doctrine contained language supporting centralized allocation and
direction, then included the assertion that “decentralized control and execution are
fundamental to the effective application of aerospace power” (AF Manual 1-1, 1971, p. 21). Later versions of Air Force doctrine evolved toward the current fundamental tenet of
centralized control, decentralized execution (USAF Doctrine Annex 3-30, 2015b, p. 8).
Some of the confusion regarding these terms is related to their having multiple
meanings, depending on context. The following are the doctrinal definitions of
centralized control, as described in the most current version of the DOD Dictionary
(2018, p. 33):
1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon makes direct target
assignments to fire units (JP 3-01).
2. In joint air operations, placing within one commander the responsibility and
authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a military operation or
group/category of operations. See also decentralized control (JP 3-30).

There are, in fact, significant differences between centralized control of air
defense-specific operations and centralized control of joint air operations. An example of
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the air defense application of this definition would be the detailed tactical direction given
to the aircrew of interceptor aircraft by a ground control intercept specialist monitoring a
radar display, much as an air traffic controller might provide vectors and altitudes to the
crew of a commercial aircraft. This is clearly different from the context of centralized
control application at the operational level involving planning, directing, and
coordinating joint air operations (Joint Publication 3-30, 2014a, p. I-3). Further adding
to the confusion is the definition of decentralized control in joint doctrine:
In air defense, the normal mode whereby a higher echelon monitors unit actions,
making direct target assignments to units only when necessary to ensure proper
fire distribution or to prevent engagement of friendly aircraft. See also
centralized control. (JP 3-01) (DOD Dictionary, 2018, p. 62)

Thus, only the air defense definition of decentralized control is formally codified;
there is no definition of decentralized control with respect to joint airpower command and
control. The mixing of air defense terminology with that of command and control writ
large and the absence of a definition of decentralized control in the context of command
and control are at odds with the precision with which authoritative joint doctrine is
generally written. This discrepancy is among the reasons Hinote (2009) cited in claiming
the Air Force’s central tenet has become “a lightning rod for emotional criticism and
intellectual challenge” (p. 55). Parramore (2004) argued the definition of decentralized
execution is also imprecise, with the result that conditions of centralized execution may
be unrecognizable. Santicola (1996) devoted a section of his master’s thesis to the
problems created by “doctrinal imprecision” (p. 8). Ankerstar (2005) suggested that the
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definitional confusion is so severe that the Air Force should abandon the existing
terminology in its master tenet. He argued for a more thoughtful understanding of the
contextual factors leading senior leaders to select a level of control along a continuum
from autonomous operations to being actively involved in control of execution details.
The next section summarizes the historical background behind the current master tenet,
before describing potential impacts of decentralizing control of joint airpower.
Historical Context for Centralized Control
The history of airpower command and control debate and doctrine offers
important insights into the issues addressed in this research. These insights include the
intellectual and institutional elements of the debate and their steady progress toward a
centralized model.
As early as WWI, proponents saw the value of centralized command and control
of airpower. Early airpower theorists argued that airpower must be used strategically and
operated independently of surface forces. Douhet (1921) argued for “the necessity of
having an air force capable of accomplishing war missions solely with its own means, to
the complete exclusion of both army and navy” (p. 5). He further argued that the use of
airpower as an auxiliary to army or navy forces is “worthless, superfluous, and harmful”
(p. 101). Late in WWI, Mitchell exercised centralized control over 1,500 Allied aircraft
supporting General Pershing’s forces at St. Mihiel, France, in what Mitchell termed “the
greatest combined force of aviation ever brought under one command” (Mitchell, 1925,
p. 30). The writings of these and similarly-minded airpower theorists carried significant
influence as the U.S. and Great Britain developed their nascent air arms during the
interwar period.
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During the period between the two world wars, the quests for independence and
for centralized control of airpower were consistent themes of airpower advocates during
this important period of airpower development. Internal Army debates and formal
doctrines sought a balance between centrally controlled aviation operations and
decentralized control of air units assigned directly to ground units for their direct support.
Even some senior non-aviators within the Army argued for centralizing the air effort.
Lieutenant General McNair, the commander of the Army’s General Headquarters and
later commander of Army Ground Forces, supported central management of air
resources. He argued central control was necessary to ensure air superiority was given
sufficient priority and because he recognized that lower-echelon commanders would
likely misuse resources (Mortensen, 1987, p. 22). McNair opposed decentralization,
which was favored by the field commanders, even though decentralization promised
speedier response time. Most ground commanders perceived the long command and
control communications chain in a centralized system would guarantee friction and
consequently impede air assistance during combat (Mortensen, p. 23).
The issue of decentralization by assigning air units to ground commanders came
to a head at the beginning of the American involvement in WWII. The Northwest Africa
campaign in WWII began with the XII Air Support Command’s air assets charged with
direct support to ground commanders (Rife, 1999, p. 71). Army doctrine at the time,
including Army Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, stipulated
that the air support command should be assigned to assist ground forces (Justice, 2004,
p. 2). Rife agreed with this assessment, although arguing that this interpretation was
largely due to ambiguities and inconsistencies in the language of the doctrine document

40
(p. 72). As a result, the air support command’s airpower in Operation Torch, the Allied
effort to push the Axis forces out of North Africa, was initially constrained to providing
direct support to the ground units to which it was assigned, and localized air superiority.
Momyer (2003) argued that the application of this doctrine meant that no one was
responsible for gaining air superiority across the theater of operations, since the ground
commanders were concerned only with the enemy aircraft that might attack their own
formations (p. 44). Leading up to the Battle for Kasserine Pass, the air assets allocated to
specific ground units were used largely as airborne artillery (Hathaway, 2011, p. 4).
The primary problem with assigning air units to ground commanders was
summed up by Luftwaffe General Karl Koller: “Every soldier generally thinks only as far
as the radius of action of his branch of the service” (Charlton, 2013, p. 67). In one
famous example, Major General Fredendall, the commander of II Corps, despite
overseeing a surplus of air support, refused to support an urgent request from a
neighboring French unit being overrun, on the grounds that his corps had no
responsibilities in the affected area (Rife, 1999, p. 72). This anecdote captures the
essence of the airpower advocates’ argument against decentralization—that breaking
airpower into small packets and assigning them to subordinate ground commanders
prevents the most efficient use of limited air assets (Hathaway, p. 4). The term pennypackets, attributed to the RAF’s Air Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, has become a widely
used, pejorative metaphor for the impact of decentralization of airpower. According to
Tedder (1946), if airpower is divided into separate packets, it loses its powers of
concentration.
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The turning point from a doctrinal point of view was a series of Allied setbacks,
culminating in the Allied disastrous showing at the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February
1943 (Atkinson, 2002). Momyer (2003) pointed to this battle as a primary demonstration
of the folly of airpower broken into parcels and subordinated to ground commanders.
Ground commanders will understandably husband their assigned air assets to support
their own requirements, with little motivation for them to support other commanders or to
provide air assets to attack distant enemy airfields or strategic targets that do not
immediately threaten their scheme of maneuver. Because there was no air commander
advocating for the air superiority mission, Kasserine Pass was the only important ground
battle of WWII in which the Allies did not have air superiority over the Luftwaffe (Rife,
p. 71).
In the aftermath of the Kasserine Pass fiasco, Army doctrine solidified around the
concept of centralized control. In July 1943, the Army introduced a major shift in
doctrine, in the form of Field Manual 100-20. The new manual’s language included the
following assertion of the need to centralize airpower:
Land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces …. Control of
available air power must be centralized, and command must be exercised through
the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive
blow are to be fully exploited. (War Department, 1944, p. 2)

Dysfunctional command arrangements resulting from interservice friction were
not limited to the European theater during WWII. Another example, briefly alluded to in
the previous chapter, was the relationship between the key commanders in the Pacific
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campaign during World War II. Unable to agree on a single commander for this theater
of operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff split the Pacific into two commands in 1943. The
Navy received responsibility for the Central Pacific advance toward Japan, while the
Army island-hopped its way toward Japan in the southwest Pacific (Griffith, 1998). At
points where the two forces operated in close proximity, there was considerable friction
between the Army Air Forces and Navy air commanders (Griffith, pp. 119-121). This
friction extended into the air domain, as the competing air and naval commanders
coordinated their aviation activities without benefit of a single manager. As Locher
(2002) noted, the failure to identify a single commander for the Pacific campaign
“doomed the Pacific theater to four decades of discord among the services and
underachievement or failure on the battlefield” (p. 200).
After WWII, the Air Force was created as a separate military service, but there
was little support from the other services regarding centralizing control of the airpower
capabilities of the military services’ various aviation arms. Barriers to joint service
consolidation included service cultures, communications barriers between platforms, and
the fact that each service had a legitimate need for its aviation arm to support its own
operational doctrine. In the Korean conflict, the initial command arrangements in 1950
provided the commander of the Far East Air Forces with an ambiguous coordination
control over naval air forces (Momyer, 2003, p. 65), which stopped short of enabling
concentration of the combined airpower capabilities against the North Koreans.
The centralization debate flared again during the Vietnam War. Commanders
from each military service resisted placing their combat elements under control of
commanders from other services. For much of the Vietnam War, the control of the air

43
effort over North Vietnam was decentralized, with the services assigned separate areas,
termed route packages, depicted in Figure 8. The targets and flight routes for Air Force
and Navy assets were geographically separated to deconflict their operations, but there
was minimal coordination between the two efforts. Lambeth (2000) argued that this
fragmented approach violated basic, long-standing beliefs of airpower theorists, and
denied the Air Force and Navy fighter forces the opportunity to combine their capabilities
to greatest effect (p. 33). The arrangement, although suboptimal from an economy-offorce standpoint, was likely the best that could be obtained given the disagreements at
senior military service levels regarding control of airpower. Momyer (2003), despite
strongly disagreeing with the route package approach, conceded that “the route package
system was a compromise approach to a tough command and control decision” (p. 108).
Disagreements on command philosophy were not strictly interservice; within the
Air Force, Strategic Air Command bombers used in conventional strikes remained under
command of their home commander in Omaha rather than under the Air Force theater air
component commander. Momyer noted “even we airmen couldn’t agree on the
operational control of the B-52s” (p. 116). During the Linebacker II operation in
December 1972, 15 B-52s were shot down over North Vietnam, at least partially
attributed to poor coordination between various providers of air assets (Michel, 2002;
Momyer, 2003). Momyer’s overall conclusion was that such arrangements significantly
sub-optimize airpower’s potential (p. 122).

44

Figure 8. Route package system in North Vietnam. Adapted from Momyer (2003, p.
107); used with permission.
Since the route package system was based on geographic separation of airpower
efforts, which is one of the points of analysis of this research study, it is worth spending a
bit of time to analyze this construct. One benefit of such a system is that the
deconfliction reduced the challenges of having to conduct detailed coordination between
Air Force and Navy air units. Even Air Force General Vogt, who succeeded Momyer as
Commander of 7th Air Force overseeing the Air Force effort in Vietnam, had to
grudgingly acknowledge that the route package system “saved a great deal of
coordination” (Clodfelter, 1989, p. 164). Another benefit was that units flying together in
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combat generally had close bonds with others on the same mission, since they belonged
to the same military service and, in many cases, lived together on the same airbases or
aircraft carriers.
There were several drawbacks to the decentralized route package system. Of key
importance, the missions for the two air armadas from the Air Force and the Navy were
planned independently; as a result, aircraft from each service struck targets in their
assigned route package sector irrespective of the overall prioritization of targets. The air
effort lost the opportunity to overwhelm enemy defenses through concentrated,
synchronized attacks. Also, when weather precluded attacks in one route package
section, the assigned assets could not easily be shifted to targets in a neighboring route
package owned by another service. The route package arrangement resulted in
considerable frustration on the part of the aircrews and reduced capability for the overall
war effort (Clancy & Horner, 1999, p. 217). A central manager of the airpower effort
could have readily adjusted the weight of effort based on the supply of air assets, the
weather, the enemy threat, and target priority.
Momyer (1975) argued that after the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam in 1972, the
command and control of the Vietnamese Air Force regressed even further, with airpower
distributed to various ground commanders contributing to its lack of effectiveness during
the North Vietnamese offensive of 1975. “The VNAF was divided up into small packets
as had been done in the early days of World War II, and as a consequence was
improperly employed by Corps Commanders whose vision was limited to the situation in
his Corps area” (p. 69).
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The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols act in 1986 proved to be a watershed event.
Locher (2002) argued that the primary motivation for the U.S. Congress to pass this
legislation was the history of convoluted command relationships caused by interservice
friction. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation had as its key objective better integration of
each of the military service’s separate capabilities into effective joint fighting units. As
noted by Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, the National Archives ranked the GoldwaterNichols Act as “the Senate Armed Services Committee’s most important legislative
achievement during its first fifty years” (Locher, p. xii). The forced integration of multiservice efforts into joint teams resulted in reduced interservice fighting and better military
cohesion and was credited by then-Secretary of Defense William Perry with the
“resounding success of our forces in Desert Storm” (Locher, p. 446). Subsequent to the
passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Doctrine for
Theater Counterair Operations, defining the position of Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC). As McNamara (1994) noted, “this was the result of 43 years of
effort on the part of the Air Force, but it did not occur without dissent” (p. 1).
After defining the position of JFACC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a
compromise to address Marine Corps-specific concerns regarding centralized
management of its air assets. In the previous chapter, it was noted that Marine Corps
doctrine includes strong language regarding the inseparability of its air assets from the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The Joint Force Air Component Commander,
however, is guided by the joint airpower doctrinal tenet of centralized control, which
would dictate that all air assets be centrally managed for maximum efficiency and unity
of effort. The 1986 Omnibus Agreement, as it was then known, is now codified in joint
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doctrine. This doctrine includes direction that USMC air assets will be used primarily to
support the MAGTF ground element; however, the MAGTF commander is required to
make sorties available for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range
reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be
provided to the JFACC for tasking (Joint Publication 1, 2017). Excess capabilities are as
determined by the MAGTF commander, although in extreme circumstances, the MAGTF
commander can be overruled by the Joint Force Commander, who retains the authority to
assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders
(Joint Publication 1, 2017, p. IV-4 to IV-5; Murrow & Bray, 1990, p. 74). During
Operation Iraqi Freedom, to avoid involving the joint force commander in an intraservice controversy, the CFACC reached an agreement with the MAGTF commander to
provide USAF A-10 close air support sorties in exchange for USMC F/A-18 long-range
strike sorties (Lambeth, 2013, pp. 190-191). This arrangement retained some elements of
centralized control while enabling the MAGTF to support its organic, decentralized
requirements.
Development of the Joint Force Air Component Commander Construct
The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a catalyst for airpower leaders to
implement their long-sought-after concept of a single manager for airpower. Not long
after enactment of the legislation, U.S. European Command established its own Joint
Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to serve as central coordinator for airpower
operations (Marquis, 2017, p. 3). In 1990, the commander of U.S. Central Command,
General Norman Schwarzkopf, tapped his air component commander, Lieutenant General
Chuck Horner, to serve as the JFACC for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
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During the planning for the Gulf War, a senior naval officer suggested to General
Horner that Iraq should be divided into route packages to reduce coordination
requirements and maintain unit cohesion, as had been done during the Vietnam conflict.
Horner, who had flown F-100 combat missions in North Vietnam, had recollections of
being unable to attack readily visible, lucrative targets because they were in the Navy’s
route package sector. Horner vehemently rejected the suggestion, instead insisting that
General Schwarzkopf had made clear his direction to use a single air manager for the
impending conflict (Clancy, 1999, p. 217).
Horner oversaw the planning, coordination, and synchronization of the air
operation that commenced on January 17, 1991. This effort integrated a combined air
armada involving assets from all the military services and participating coalition nations.
The air operation included strategic attack against key targets throughout Iraq, airbases,
command and control facilities, lines of communication, and attacking Iraqi ground
forces when the ground operation was launched forty days later. While generally seen as
overwhelmingly successful, some skepticism remained on the part of other services
(Gordon &Trainor, 1995). The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) staff was
predominantly from the Air Force, leading to concerns about the degree of jointness, or
multi-service coordination, associated with the planning and execution of the air
operation. This concern was addressed in subsequent campaigns by the inclusion of
officers from other services in the CAOC staff, and, in some cases, placing senior officers
from other services and other countries in CAOC leadership positions. For example,
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the deputy CFACC was a navy admiral, and the CAOC
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director positions were filled by senior officers from the U.S. Air Force, Britain’s Royal
Air Force, and from the Royal Australian Air Force (Lambeth, 2013, p. 216).
During the initial phases of Desert Storm, the ground forces’ leadership expressed
concerns to General Schwarzkopf about inadequate priority for close air support and
complained that their nominated targets did not receive sufficient priority. General
Horner subsequently implemented a push-CAS concept, in which pre-planned CAS
sorties were launched in anticipation of ground commanders’ requests (Horner, 2000, p.
21). If, after the sorties launched, there was no immediate need for CAS, the aircraft
attacked targets in the enemy rear area. This arrangement ensured there was no shortage
of available airpower when needed by the ground force commanders yet minimized
wasting airpower capabilities on CAS missions that did not materialize before the aircraft
ran low on fuel (Lambeth, 2000, p. 132). In addition, each service retained control of
some portion of its air assets, termed organic, to support its own requirements, so there
were aspects of airpower not within the JFACC’s purview to control. But, overall, most
observers saw Desert Storm as a validation of the JFACC construct (Marquis, 2017, p. 9).
The designation of a functional component as the single manager for airpower
became the standard during the series of conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet
bloc in 1991. When multiple countries are involved, the position is referred to as the
Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC). The single air manager
construct has been successfully employed in combat in the NATO operation to halt ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Operations Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and
Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, and Operation Unified Protector in Libya (Lambeth, 2001, 2005).
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During Operation Desert Storm, Horner operated out of a command center
established in the basement of the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation in Riyadh
(Clancy, 1999, p. 200). Since then, the Air Force has made a significant effort to
professionalize the air operations centers from which the JFACCs or CFACCs will
operate. Each of the various AOCs evolved individually based on the needs of its
circumstance. In 2000, the Air Force Chief of Staff designated the AOCs as a weapon
system, which elevated the AOC’s status and obliged the Air Force leadership to increase
priority for allocation of trained personnel and resources (Justice, 2004, p. 15).
Centralization Versus Decentralization
The preceding historical analysis outlines a general trend toward greater
centralization in airpower command and control of airpower. However, there remain
strong voices on both sides of the issue among those who have thought deeply about
command and control.
In Command in War, van Creveld (1985) described the spectrum of command and
the implications of choosing a more centralized or decentralized approach to command
and control (C2). He used a case study approach to illustrate the nature of command to
argue that the centralized approach requires increased information collection and
processing capacity and leads to greater communications requirements and a larger, more
complex central-directing organ. In van Creveld’s view, decentralized C2 requires
organizations to operate with less information, or to divide the C2 task into smaller pieces
that specialized subcomponents can handle independently. It should be noted that the
bulk of van Creveld’s case studies predated the modern airpower era, focusing on ancient
Greek and Roman warriors: Alexander, Napolean, and the von Moltkes of Prussia. The
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most modern case study examined by van Creveld was the U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
in which the only airpower he discussed is the Army’s fleet of helicopters. Throughout
his book, van Creveld argued that senior commanders should employ a “directed
telescope” to keep apprised of the activities of subordinates without impeding tactical
initiative, relying on messengers, later telegraphs, and more recently radio
communications. Yet when discussing airpower in Vietnam, he roundly criticized the use
of helicopters in the role of directed telescopes to monitor and micromanage the activities
of each subsequent level (pp. 232-260). In the end, van Creveld, while acknowledging
the improvements in communications technologies, made clear his conviction that
decentralization is superior to centralization. He argued that decision thresholds are best
located as far down the command structure as possible, and supported creation of
balanced, self-contained units that can exploit freedom of action at the tactical level. He
noted that the choices between centralization and decentralization boil down to a
readiness to accept greater uncertainty at higher headquarters while simultaneously
reducing uncertainty at lower levels (p. 274).
Kometer’s (2007) Command in Air War can be characterized as an airman’s
response to van Creveld’s Command in War. Kometer analyzed the impact of
information technology on the doctrinal tenet of centralized control and decentralized
execution, examining airpower command and control during Operations Desert Storm,
Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. Over the course of the period
analyzed, the Air Operations Center emerged as the central figure in the planning,
tasking, and assessment of combat airpower operations. Kometer made extensive use of
primary research, including interviews and original documents. He introduced the
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concept of a Combat Air Operations System (CAOS) which treats all C2 participants as
being part of a single system. Kometer also discussed the important notion of system
coupling, in which individual tasks are assembled to execute a mission (p. 72). System
coupling complicates efforts to decentralize control of specific tasks, since those tasks
may be linked to others requiring a more centralized direction. An example might be
short-range fighters, which are often integrated with longer-range tankers for mission
execution. Kometer, building on the work of Perrow (1999), asserted that tightly coupled
systems are best centralized, while complex, loosely coupled systems can be
decentralized (p. 61).
Gerber (1997) noted that Air Force leaders tend to link decentralization with both
inefficiency and suboptimal use of finite resources. Yet he noted that there are trends in
modern business, government, economics, science, and computer and communications
systems that suggest that decentralized C2 can, in fact, be more effective and efficient
than a highly centralized structure. Using complexity theory, Gerber developed a
networked hierarchical organization to build a predominantly decentralized C2 system.
This system employed mission-type orders, requiring revisions in training, doctrine, and
education. Gerber argued his decentralized model could provide theater air component
commanders with a spectrum of options for organizing the C2 structure.
Gray (1999) developed a theory of airpower expressed in 27 dicta, or axioms.
Dictum 14 argues that “the air is one, and so is airpower” (p. 286). Gray expressed
concern that non-air-minded military leaders will fail to understand how to best employ
airpower, while recognizing that airmen may exhibit parochial concern for air-specific
matters at the expense of their joint allies. In contrast to van Creveld, Gray argued that
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the “geography of air warfare and the necessary nature and evolving character of
airpower demand that a centralizing approach to the air be the default wisdom” (p. 287).
Decauer’s (2014) work is largely supportive of the doctrinal tenet of centralized
control / decentralized execution. Decauer introduced the notion of operational
flexibility, a term describing “harmonizing operations to maximize the effectiveness of
airpower through the range of military operations” (p. 32). Fundamentally, operational
flexibility places increased C2 capabilities at lower levels to improve coordination with
other components during planning and execution. While Decauer’s discussion did not
include concerns regarding resilience of the C2 structure, this concept would appear to
have applicability to the problem posed in this research.
Alberts, along with Hayes (2003, 2006) and Manso (2012), have extensively
researched the subject of military command and control. Together they orchestrated
DOD’s Command and Control Research Program for several years before establishing
the International Command and Control Institute, where Alberts serves as president.
Alberts and Hayes (2003) noted that control determines “whether current and/or planned
efforts are on track. If adjustments are required, the function of control is to make these
adjustments if they are within the guidelines established by command” (p. 59). They
advocated pushing control as much as possible to the edge, rather than centralizing.
Their review of evidence from 20th century command and control case studies concluded
that the appropriate approach depended on several factors, including:


The warfighting environment–from static to mobile



The continuity of communications



The volume and quality of information
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The professional competence of the decision makers and their forces



The degree of creativity and initiative that decision makers (particularly
subordinate commanders) are expected to exercise (Alberts & Hayes, 2003,
p. 19)

Cyr (2014) included a discussion on distributed C2, described as “moving
authorities for certain C2 tasks down to the tactical level of war” (p. 22) to better cope
with degraded or contested environments. He acknowledged the uneasiness associated
with the risks of moving previously centrally-controlled aspects of C2 to the edge as
described in Alberts and Hayes (2003).
The notion of distributed control can be considered a hybrid approach between
polar extremes of centralization and decentralization. Baran (1964) described advantages
and disadvantages of each architecture in the context of communications networks.
Figure 9 depicts simplified depictions of centralized, decentralized, and distributed
networked organizations. Baran’s paper, though written over 50 years ago, contains
observations that support today’s analysis of C2 networks. For example, Baran noted
“The centralized node is obviously vulnerable as destruction of a single central node
destroys communication between the end stations” (p. 1).
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Figure 9. Centralized, decentralized, and distributed network depictions. From Baran,
1964, p. 2. Used with permission.
More recently, Hukill and Mortensen (2011) argued that the Air Force has
become wedded to a “one-size fits all” configuration, inhibiting fully effective command
and control across the spectrum of conflict (p. 53). They expressed concern that the
focus on airpower C2 at the combatant-commander level will limit airpower’s flexibility
in responding to situations requiring decision authority below the theater level. In their
view, centralizing at “the appropriate level of command” (p. 54) will be necessary for
airpower to be able to effectively respond to situations across the full range of military
operations. Centralizing at the appropriate level of command would necessarily involve
decentralizing at least some aspects of airpower from the current emphasis on the theatercommand level; this is reflective of the two-sides-of-the-same coin argument mentioned
earlier. It should be noted that Hukill and Mortensen’s concerns are focused on
airpower’s effectiveness to respond to the complex operating environments that the future

56
portends, without mentioning the need for decentralization to maintain resiliency in the
face of threats to a centralized C2 structure.
The centralization-decentralization debate extends into other fields, including
organizational theory. A study by Kanth, Mohapatra, Mohanty, and Basak (2013)
claimed software firms could save up to 10% on software testing by centralizing the
process. On the other hand, Lauver and Trank (2012) argued that organizational
centralization can have a negative impact on safety, even citing the National Commission
on BP Deepwater Horizon, which claimed a BP decision to centralize oversight functions
contributed to the disaster.
Various metaphors have been used to help visualize centralized and decentralized
organizational structures. Morgan (1993) used a house plant metaphor to describe the
benefits of decentralized organizational structure; the centralized organization is
represented by a robust potted plant with scrawny subsidiary offshoots that wither and
die, while the decentralized organization is represented by a spider plant with healthy,
self-sufficient offshoots. Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) used a spider versus starfish
metaphor to show that a central decision-making node may be at a disadvantage
compared to an organization with distributed cognition. A spider whose legs have been
severed will wither and die, while the more resilient starfish will grow new arms to
replace severed ones. One challenge with applying this metaphor involves retaining the
spider-like organization’s capacity for learning and its agility, while reaping the benefits
of the resilience of the starfish-like organizations.
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C2 Constructs for Distributing or Decentralizing Control
While trending over time toward greater centralization, airpower command and
control will need to include options for decentralized or distributed control to enhance
resiliency in the face of threats to the C2 structure. Lyle (2014) argued that a holistic C2
structure must be able to support four key functions: build situational awareness, translate
commander’s intent, produce feasible plans, and conduct mission control (p. 59-60).
Some general options for decentralizing or distributing control could include:


Within the JFACC construct, distributing the command and control
responsibilities to subordinate control nodes. This construct could enhance
resiliency in the face of threats to a centralized Air Operations Center. The
network of multiple subordinate control nodes would present challenges to an
adversary attempting to decapitate the friendly air component C2 structure.
This concept could involve employing existing structures (such as Control and
Reporting Centers, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, Air
Support Operations Centers, or individual Wing Operations Centers) that have
been trained and equipped to operate under a distributed control structure
without guidance and support from a JFACC’s Air Operations Center. The
resulting C2 structure might resemble either Figure 9b (decentralized) or
Figure 9c (distributed) control.



Assigning subordinate joint force commanders their own service and
functional air components, rather than having them depend on support from
the superior commander’s air component. The assignment or attachment of
air forces to a subordinate joint force commander represents a type of
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decentralization. Creating separate air components for joint force
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, both within the U.S. Central Command
area of responsibility, would have represented an example of this approach.
Figure 10 depicts a notional organizational structure with subordinate joint
task forces, each with its own JFACC. Note that the theater JFACC could
retain some forces to be used to support theater requirements or used to
support the highest priority requirements between the two JTFs. These
theater-level platforms would likely be available in limited supply and would
need to have sufficient range to support either JTF; such platforms typically
include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, air refueling
aircraft, or long-range airlift aircraft.

Figure 10. Depiction of organizational option for sub-theater JFACCs supporting
multiple joint task forces. Adapted from McLean, 2017, slide16. Used with permission.
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Operating with service components (Air Force component, Navy component,
Marine Corps component, etc.), with each service responsible for specific
missions or specific geographical operating areas. This approach would
represent a reversion to parochial decentralization along service lines, as each
service component would employ its organic air assets, deconflicted from
each other by time or space, reminiscent of the previously described route
package system employed in the Vietnam conflict. The organizational
depiction could resemble that of the service components in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Organizing the joint force using service components. Adapted from McLean,
2017, slide 15. Used with permission.
The present research is not intended to compare different modalities of
decentralizing control; rather, the above discussion is provided to give a general idea of
C2 options that might be used depending on the operational circumstance and preferences
of the combatant commander. The research effort compares a centralized JFACC model,
such as that depicted in Figure 2 of the previous chapter, with a decentralized structure,
which could take the form of one of those discussed in this section.
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Dissecting Factors in the Balance Between Centralization and Decentralization
As articulated in the previous chapter, this research focuses on the quantitative
analyses of operational factors that influence the tradeoffs between centralization and
decentralization of airpower command and control. Several previous research efforts
have laid the groundwork for the present study.
Hinote’s (2009) monograph Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution—A
Catchphrase in Crisis? provides a thorough historical review of the evolution of the
central doctrinal tenet, including an assessment of the application of the doctrinal tenet to
the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the most important considerations in
the orchestration of joint airpower, one that Hinote (2009) argued is “perhaps the most
important consideration” (p. 58), is the degree to which command and control is
centralized. As discussed previously in this chapter, Hinote pointed out that one of the
major difficulties with the foundational tenet is the language itself— centralized control
itself is misunderstood, misinterpreted, and controversial. The tenet has undergone
occasional adjustments throughout airpower’s relatively brief history; in fact, the Air
Force has, at various times, argued the essentiality of both centralized control and
decentralized control.
Hinote (2009) suggested a more appropriate summation of the doctrine would be
“Centralized command and control at the strategic and operational levels of war,
decentralized execution at the tactical level” (p. 57). The operational level is defined as
“the level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted,
and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas”
(DOD Dictionary, 2018, p. 173). Hinote pointed out that airpower is ideally applied at
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the tactical level with an eye toward connecting tactical results with strategic objectives
(p. 18). A key assertion in Hinote’s monograph is that the appropriate degree of
centralization of command and control required for effective airpower employment
hinges on answers to five fundamental questions (pp. 59-64), summarized in Figure 12.
The questions that are directly pertinent to the present research are highlighted in bold
text in the figure.

1. What is the nature of the operation?


Strategic attack => Centralization



Close Air Support => Decentralization

2. Where should flexibility be preserved?


Nuclear operations => Centralization


When tactical actions can lead to political consequences, Centralization is
appropriate



Tactical air operations in direct support to ground forces => Decentralization


Decentralization allows airpower to be redistributed among tactical control nodes

3. What is the geographical range of effects?


Assets that can flex from area to area => Centralization




E.g., long-range bombers, ISR platforms, space and cyber assets

Assets with limited range => Decentralization


E.g., short-range, unrefuelable platforms

4. How many assets are available?


The more assets available to the Joint Force Commander, the less the requirement for
centralization

5. Who has the best situational awareness?


Time Sensitive Targeting => Centralized at Air Ops Center



Local air engagements => Decentralized (CRC, AWACS)

Figure 12. Hinote’s five questions to find the balance between centralization and
decentralization (Hinote, 2009, pp. 58-64). Note: The questions that are applicable to this
study are in bold type.

62
Hukill et al. (2012) argued that the Air Force needs to reconsider its strong
preference for centralizing airpower command and control at the theater level. In their
monograph Air Force Command and Control: The Need for Increased Adaptability the
authors provided options for decentralizing aspects of the airpower C2 structure, in order
to improve responsiveness to lower-level commanders requirements and to improve
resilience against near-peer adversaries. In a vein similar to Hinote’s monograph, Hukill
et al. identified five key qualitative factors that influence the design of an airpower C2
structure (pp. 8-10), summarized in Figure 13. The factors that are directly pertinent to
the present research are highlighted in bold text in the figure.

1. Nature of the operation


Airlift, strategic attack => Centralization



Air support to distributed land fight => Decentralization

2. Available resources


Scarcity of assets => Centralization



Plentiful supply of assets => Decentralization

3. Capabilities of subordinate units


Subordinates dependent on detailed guidance => Centralization



Subordinates organized, trained, and equipped to operate independent of detailed
guidance => Decentralization

4. Degree of trust and confidence


Low degree of trust and confidence => Centralization



High degree of trust and confidence => Decentralization

5. Political risk


High degree of political risk from military activities => Centralization



Lower degree of political risk from military activities => Decentralization

Figure 13. Hukill et al.’s five influences on the fundamental elements of command and
control (Hukill et. al., 2012, pp. 8-10). Note: The factors that are applicable to this study
are in bold type.
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Betts (2014), in Airpower’s Master Tenet and Anti-Access / Area Denial: Hope Is
Not a Course of Action, argued that with the rise of adversaries with the potential
capability to paralyze the central decision-making nodes, the Air Force must be prepared
to decentralize its doctrinal command and control model. While both Hinote’s (2009)
and Hukill et al.’s primary focus was on issues associated with the appropriate level of
airpower C2 for maximum effect, Betts (2014) argued that a primary consideration must
be resiliency in the face of threats to the C2 network. Hinote’s and Hukill et al.’s
discussions regarding balancing centralization and decentralization presumed robust
connectivity between control nodes and the execution level. Betts claimed that with the
rise of adversaries with the potential capability to paralyze the central decision-making
nodes, the Air Force should transition to a doctrinal command and control model he
summarized as: centralized command, adaptive control, and decentralized execution.
Betts derived seven elemental factors to guide the appropriate degree of
centralization or decentralization, as shown in Figure 14. Betts depicted his factors on
sliding scales, each creating a band between complete centralization and complete
decentralization. Finding an alignment of the sliding scales could facilitate finding an
appropriate balance between the two extremes. The factors that are directly pertinent to
the present research are highlighted in bold text in the figure.
Although the alignments are not precise, Hinote’s five questions, Hukill et al.’s
five influences, and Betts’s seven elemental factors overlap in several respects. The
preceding three figures show some common threads between the studies. All three of
those studies discuss centralization and decentralization in qualitative terms; this research
subjected several of the operational considerations identified by those researchers to
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quantitative scrutiny: the geographic range of effects, the quantity and capability of assets
available relative to the demand for airpower, and the relative capabilities of the
centralized versus the decentralized C2 nodes, as discussed below.

1. Time Available in Decision Cycle


More time available => Enables centralization



Less time available => Forces decentralization

2. Bandwidth (Comm/Data)


More bandwidth available => Enables centralization



Less bandwidth available => Forces decentralization

3. Geographic Range of Effects


Greater geographic range => Enables centralization



Less geographic range => Forces decentralization

4. Scarcity of Platforms


Fewer platforms available => Forces centralization



More platforms available => Enables decentralization

5. Need for Higher Level Synchronization


Large requirement for higher Level Synchronization => Forces centralization



Less requirement for higher-level synchronization => Enables decentralization

6. Sensitivity to Unintended Consequences


High sensitivity to unintended consequences => Forces centralization



Low sensitivity to unintended consequences => Enables decentralization

7. Mistrust of Subordinate Process Ownership (Situational Awareness, Competence, Initiative)


Less trust in subordinates => Forces centralization



More trust in subordinates => Enables decentralization

Figure 14. Betts’s seven elemental determinants to balance centralization and
decentralization (Betts, 2014, p. 8). Note: The Betts determinants applicable to this study
are in bold type.
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Geographic range of effects. Hinote (2009) and Betts (2014) both argued that
the balance shifts toward decentralization when assets are range-limited, such as is the
case with rotary winged assets and some unmanned aerial systems (UASs). The rationale
is straightforward: since range-limited assets are restricted to operating in a confined
area, there is much less capability to apply these airpower assets in a flexible manner
against the greatest requirements across a wide area. This observation is neither new nor
particularly surprising; the 1943 Army doctrinal publication FM 100-20 contained a
caveat supporting decentralization when forces are “operating independently or are
isolated by distance” (War Department, 1944, p. 2).
Each of the operational conditions in this research has an opposite side to its coin.
In the case of the range of assets, the inverse is also true: longer-range assets should
move the balance toward centralization, because they are more capable of being applied
against the greatest needs of the joint force across a wide area. The capabilities of air
assets that can reach an entire theater of operations, or across the globe, will likely be
suboptimized if assigned to subordinate command and control nodes (Hinote, 2009, p.
61).
Quantity and capabilities of assets available. Hinote (2009), Hukill et al.
(2012), and Betts (2014) all argued that the greater the quantity of assets available to the
joint force air component commander, the less the requirement for centralization. The
rationale is straight-forward: as the number of assets under decentralized control
increases, the closer each decentralized sector will come to near-self-sufficiency, with an
associated reduction in the need for centralization. As is the case with geographic range,
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the inverse can also be argued: scarcity of assets drives centralization, since with fewer
assets there is an associated greater requirement to apply those scarce assets against the
highest priority requirements, which may happen to be outside the area under control of a
decentralized node.
Deptula (2001) would likely argue that all three have it wrong; Deptula
maintained the number of assets available is not as important as the capabilities they
bring. Simply stated, increasing the number of lower-capable assets may not prove as
effective as replacing them with an equal number of higher-capable assets. Deptula made
his point visually as depicted in Figure 15, showing that a small number of highly capable
platforms can be more effective than greater numbers of platforms with less capability.

Figure 15. Impact of increased munition precision on the concept of mass. From
Deptula, 2001, p. 8. Used with permission.
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In an extreme example, one B-2 bomber delivering 16 precision-guided munitions
(PGMs) could theoretically neutralize as many discrete targets as would have required
16,000 B-17 sorties conducting high-altitude bombing in WWII. An internal Air Force
memorandum supports this general conclusion, while noting that the trade-off analysis is
clouded by the likelihood that the thousands of non-precision weapons dropped would
create additional collateral damage and casualties (Owen, memorandum to J. Warden,
September 1, 1991). Despite the caveats, Hinote’s, Hukill et al.’s, and Betts’ assertions
regarding the effect of increasing the quantity of assets would be better phrased in terms
of weapon system capabilities, rather than simple numbers. This research effort
addresses both the effects of increasing the numbers and the effects of increasing the
capabilities of Blue assets.
Degradation of the capabilities of the centralized C2 node. The final factor to
be analyzed in this study is the impact of degrading the C2 capabilities and capacities of
the centralized node, while holding the decentralized control nodes’ capabilities constant.
In Hinote’s (2009) study, this factor is addressed in Question Five regarding degree of
situational awareness at each of the command nodes. If the centralized control node has a
high degree of situational awareness, then the airpower assets will be most effectively
orchestrated from the central node. Hinote provided an example in which the central
node may have access to intelligence unavailable at a lower level, thus its capability to
orchestrate air operations may be greater, relative to the decentralized nodes. By the
same token, lower-level decentralized control nodes, such as a Control and Reporting
Center, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, or Wing Operations Centers may
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have better real-time awareness of the tactical situation and be in a better position to
direct defensive counterair operations, relative to the more distant, higher-level
centralized node. Hukill et al. (2012) approached this issue of relative capabilities of
centralized versus decentralized C2 nodes through the capabilities of subordinate units.
They argue such subordinate units can be effective if properly organized, trained, and
equipped (p. 9). Betts (2014) approached the issue of relative capabilities of the control
nodes through a different, more nuanced lens than that of either Hinote or Hukill et al.;
Betts broke this factor into two determinants: relative bandwidth and relative force
capabilities.
Relative bandwidth. Betts (2014) referenced the factors that Alberts and Hayes
(2003) identified for determining the appropriate C2 approach, discussed earlier in this
chapter. Particularly germane are two key considerations:


The continuity of communications, which may vary from limited to
continuous



The quality and volume of information moving between echelons and
functions (Betts, 2014, p. 8)

Betts (2014) combined these factors to form his second determinant, that of
bandwidth. The bandwidth factor is an indicator of the robustness of the connections
between the C2 nodes and their associated warfighters. As Betts hypothesized, reduced
bandwidth forces decentralization of command and control, since the command elements
have reduced capability to provide direction to subordinate forces. It is worth noting that
the 1943 Army doctrinal publication FM 100-20 included a caveat that advises against
decentralization unless ground forces are isolated by “lack of communication” (War
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Department, 1944, p. 2). This reduction in bandwidth could be a result of technical
failures, or, in a conflict with a near-peer competitor, could be a result of physical or
cyberspace attack on the centralized command center. Presuming subordinate nodes have
greater resilience, due for example to proximity to their forces or to robust servicespecific links, the relative capability of subordinate nodes will increase compared to that
of the centralized node.
Relative force capabilities. Betts (2014) described his seventh determinant as
“mistrust of subordinate process ownership” (p. 10), combining such factors as
situational awareness, subordinate force competence, and subordinate force commander
initiative. Essentially this determinant compares the effectiveness of a force when
operating in decentralized mode with that when commanded from a central node.
Decentralization may, for example, offer the advantages of increased speed of the
decision cycle, operating with formed teams, and increased initiative, at the expense of
coordinated action and efficiency when orchestrated from a centralized node.
Implications for the Master Tenet and for the Future of Command and Control
Various authors have proposed revisions to the doctrinal tenet of centralized
control, decentralized execution, primarily in recognition of confusion regarding the
meaning of control and the recognition of advanced threats to centralized command
nodes. Hinote (2009) argued that the Air Force doctrinal master tenet would be better
stated, in abbreviated form, as “centralized command and control at the strategic and
operational levels of war, decentralized execution at the tactical level” (p. 57). Betts
(2014) and Marzolf (2009), whose theses are largely focused on concerns about resilience
of the command and control architecture, argued a more appropriate synopsis of the
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doctrinal tenet would read “centralized command, adaptive control, decentralized
execution” (Betts, p. 20; Marzolf, p. 37). Hostage and Broadwell (2014) argued for
adopting the concept of “centralized command, distributed control, decentralized
execution” (p. 38). Whether or not there is actual change to the words in doctrine, there
is clearly recognition that the command and control of airpower must evolve to meet
modern challenges to remain an asymmetric advantage in future conflicts.
The trend in airpower C2 can be characterized as a trend in the general direction
of greater integration, and potentially greater centralization. Each of the military services
is currently engaged in developing capabilities to increase C2 integration to achieve
multi-domain command and control. The Air Force, for example, has undertaken a major
effort to increase operational agility and integrate capabilities in and through the air,
space, and cyberspace domains (Bruza & Reith, 2018; Hirsch, 2018; Reilly, 2016). The
Army and Marines have teamed up to develop an emerging construct termed MultiDomain Battle (U.S. Army, 2017). These efforts are on the heels of an Air Force-Navy
led effort termed Air-Sea Battle, now labeled Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global
Commons (Hutchens, Dries, Perdew, Bryant, & Moores, 2017). All the military services
are developing technologies and processes that would create capabilities for greater
integration across domains and across components, to create multiple dilemmas for an
adversary. Yet these highly effective, centralized capabilities could be impacted by a
forced decentralization of C2 through the actions of a near-peer adversary (Hostage &
Broadwell, 2014).
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Summary
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature regarding the trade-offs between
centralized and decentralized command and control of airpower. The debate regarding
the appropriate degree of centralization dates to the earliest days of the military
application of airpower. Because of its limited capabilities, airpower was initially
regarded as an auxiliary of ground and naval forces, enhancing existing capabilities of
communications, reconnaissance, and fire support. As the capabilities of airpower
increased, advocates began to argue for treating airpower as co-equal to ground forces,
and even as a force that could achieve strategic effects independent of surface forces
more quickly and will reduce cost to friendly forces. After the Goldwater-Nichols
legislation, the designation of a joint force air component commander (JFACC) has
become the norm rather than the exception.
Commanders have several options available to decentralize C2 should conditions
warrant. Control can be distributed through existing JFACC control nodes, such as the
Air Support Operations Centers and the Wing Operations Centers, provided these nodes
are properly equipped and provided with sufficient numbers of trained personnel.
Subordinate joint task forces could be provided with their own JFACCs, along with
appropriate C2 systems to plan, task, and execute air operations. Another option,
hearkening back to the much-maligned route package system used in Vietnam, would be
to operate as service components, with each military service orchestrating its own air
operations, presumably deconflicted through time or space.
Under any of these decentralization options there would be a difference between
their effectiveness in commanding airpower compared to operating under a more
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centralized control construct. This difference will be affected by operational conditions,
including geographic separation between operating areas, the number and capability of
the assigned assets, and the capabilities of the subordinate nodes and their assigned and
attached forces. The next chapter will address the methodology to be used in this study
to compare centralized and decentralized control under these three operational conditions.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
“If you don't know where you’re going, you'll end up someplace else”
Yogi Berra (Berra, 1998, p. 132)
The key research question addressed by this study is: from a baseline of
centralized C2, what is the impact on airpower effectiveness when airpower C2 is
decentralized, and how is this difference between the two types of C2 impacted by
changes in three operational conditions? The dependent variable in the analysis was the
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
control. There were two independent variables: the operational condition and the
scenario complexity. Three operational conditions were analyzed at multiple levels: the
difference in the geographic range of Blue assets, the quantity and quality of Blue assets,
and the capability of the Blue centralized C2 node. The hypotheses were assessed under
both an uncontested and contested scenario. This study used an experimental research
design employing wargame modeling to quantitatively assess the impact of these factors
on the dependent variable.
Research Approach
The research employed the JAEX wargaming model to generate the outcomes for
subsequent analysis. As noted by Simpson (2015), “C2 modeling to understand complex
systems provides one more arrow in the quiver to evaluate operational C2 as compared to
actual warfare, historical studies, or field experiments” (p. 184). Davidson and Pogel
(2010) argued that models and simulations offer a “cost-effective method for exploring
issues within the C2 domain” (p. 1). They described two types of C2 models: one type
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explicitly models the C2 functions, while the other type provides force effectiveness as an
output without modeling all the internal C2 functions. JAEX fits the description of the
latter type of model, labeled “ITFE,” (Davidson & Pogel, p. 2).
The study tested the impacts that varying each of three operational conditions had
on the mean difference in outcomes between centralized and decentralized control, as
measured by the attrition-based JAEX model. Under centralized control, Blue assets
could reach Red targets in all three sectors, subject to their inherent aircraft range
limitations. Under decentralized control, Blue assets were restricted to the respective
North, Central, or South geographic segments, as depicted in Figure 5. The asymmetric
distribution of Red target values in each sector created the potential for differentiation
between JAEX outcomes conducted under Blue centralized control and those conducted
under decentralized control. The Red side operated in decentralized mode for all test
points, so the variations in outcomes were attributable to changes in the C2 mode on the
Blue side. The resulting difference between mean centralized outcomes and mean
decentralized outcomes constituted the dependent variable for this research.
As discussed in Appendix A, each JAEX run produces an attrition-based
numerical result based on opponent’s assets damaged or destroyed. Each asset, including
aircraft and targets, is assigned a numeric value; each side gains points by damaging or
destroying adversary assets. Positive results reflect a Blue advantage. Figure 16 depicts
histograms of notional centralized and decentralized JAEX outcome distributions. The
horizontal axis represents the JAEX outcome values. The outcomes were grouped in
intervals of 100, and the vertical axis represents the number of JAEX runs that produced
an outcome within that range. For example, the tallest blue-green bar shows that there
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were 77 JAEX runs under decentralized control that produced an outcome of between
7,000 and 7,100.

Figure 16. Comparing histograms of notional JAEX outcomes.
An important property of subtracting normal distributions, as described in
Appendix B, states that the distribution of differences between two normal distributions
is itself normally distributed. Thus, computing the mathematical difference between the
outcomes under the normally distributed centralized control and the outcomes under the
normally distributed decentralized control should theoretically generate a mean
difference distribution that is also normally distributed. Chapter IV includes a discussion
for each experiment in which the theoretical mean and variance for the difference
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control
are compared to the experimentally obtained values for the mean and variance. This
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property of normal distributions enabled statistical comparison of the mean difference
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control
using ANOVA tests for equality of means which require normally distributed
populations.
Design and Procedures
The research analyzed hypotheses regarding centralized and decentralized control
under three operational conditions: the impact of geographic separation between
operational sectors, the impact of changing the quantity and capability of Blue assets, and
the impact of degrading the capability of the Blue centralized C2 node. The operational
conditions are addressed individually in subsequent sections of this chapter. The
experiments included analysis of each of the operational conditions under two levels of
scenario complexity: uncontested and contested, described in more detail below. Each
run of the JAEX model generated a numerical outcome score as described in Appendix
A. For each level of operational condition and scenario complexity, the JAEX model
executed 1,000 runs under centralized control, in which any Blue aircraft could strike any
Red target within range, and under decentralized control, in which Blue aircraft could
only strike targets within their respective sector. Subtracting the 1,000 decentralized
outcomes from the 1,000 centralized outcomes produced the distribution of the study’s
dependent variable, the outcome difference. To demonstrate some robustness of the
results under different levels of scenario complexity, each experiment was conducted
using scenarios of differing complexities, described as uncontested and contested.
Uncontested scenario. In the uncontested scenario, Blue conducted strikes
against undefended Red targets. The real-world analog involves an adversary incapable
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of mounting an effective active defense against the Blue air operation, due to military
incapacity, surprise, or some other factor. The Blue side operated from three airbases,
one in each of its C2 sectors, each of which generated a specified number of strike sorties
for each of the three turns of the model’s play. The JAEX model’s algorithms paired the
Blue strike aircraft against the highest Red priority targets within range. The baseline
geographic layout used in this research is shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17. JAEX uncontested scenario depiction. This figure depicts the three Blue
bases and the Red target set used in the uncontested scenario.
Contested scenario. The more complex contested scenario involved adding
assets and missions to both Blue and Red sides, enabling Red to defend against the Blue
attacks. In addition to its strike aircraft, the Blue side could generate 12 air-to-air
offensive counterair (OCA) fighter sweep sorties, six suppression of air defense (SEAD)
sorties, and six air-to-air defensive counterair (DCA) sorties per turn. The Red side was
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provided a surface-to-air missile battery defending a high-value target, six air-to-air
aircraft for DCA missions to defend its airspace, and six air-to-ground aircraft for strike
missions.
In JAEX, each aircraft is assigned a proficiency rating which serves as a
composite of aircrew and aircraft capabilities. The proficiency ratings range from “F”
(low proficiency) to “A” (high proficiency). Except as noted below, the Blue aircraft
were programmed at the “C” level of proficiency, while their Red counterparts were
assigned an “E” rating, reflecting an assessed Blue advantage in aircrew training and
aircraft capability. The JAEX geographic layout used for the contested scenario is shown
in Figure 18.

Figure 18. JAEX contested scenario depiction. This figure depicts the three Blue bases
and the Red target set used in the uncontested scenario.
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The experiment assessed the three operational conditions under both the
uncontested and contested conditions. The following sections describe in more detail the
research questions, the hypotheses, and the research designs for each of the operational
conditions.
Range constraints on Blue aircraft. The first specific research question
addressed is:
RQ1: What is the effect of increasing the proportion of Blue air assets that is
range-limited (restricted to the geographic sector in which they are based) on the mean
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
control?
This operational condition reflects range limitations of the assets employed on the
Blue side, or, equivalently, the effect of increasing the geographic separation between the
sectors on the Red side. This range-limiting condition increasingly restricts Blue’s ability
to shift the air effort to other sectors to strike high-priority targets.
For the baseline operational condition, termed near, all the Blue aircraft could
range the entire Red target set without restriction. Under the midrange operational
condition, one-half of the Blue aircraft were restricted to the same sector as their launch
base. Finally, in the far condition, all Blue aircraft were restricted to attacking Red
targets in their own sector. Each of these treatments was examined under the uncontested
and contested scenario complexity factors using the experimental design in Table 1.
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Table 1
Experimental Design for H1, Geographic Separation
Scenario
Condition

Uncontested

Contested

Near

XC11 , XD11

XC12 , XD12

Midrange

XC21 , XD21

XC22 , XD22

Far

XC31 , XD31

XC32 , XD32

If XC11 is the outcome of centralized control in column 1, row 1 of Table 1, and
XD11 is the corresponding outcome under decentralized control, and both are normally
distributed, then their outcome difference (XCD11 = XC11- XD11) will also be normally
distributed, per Appendix B. The outcome difference distributions were assessed for
near-normality as a condition of performing subsequent parametric statistical testing. If
µCDnm represents the mean of the distribution of the difference between the outcomes
under centralized and decentralized control in row n, column m (for n=1, 2, 3; m=1, 2) of
Table 2 (XCnm – XDnm), then the first alternative hypotheses assert that as the proportion
of Blue assets that can operate outside their assigned sector decreases, the mean
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and contested scenarios:
H1: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32
The associated null hypotheses are that as the proportion of assets that can operate
outside their assigned sector decreases, the mean difference between outcomes under
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or
increase, in both the uncontested and contested scenarios:
H10:

µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32
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Quantity and capability of Blue aircraft. The second research question is
divided into two subparts, one focused on the number of Blue assets, the other on the
capability of Blue assets. The first subpart of this research question is:
RQ2a: What is the effect of increasing the number of available Blue assets on the
mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under
decentralized control?
To address this research question, the JAEX model generated Blue strike aircraft
at three levels: the baseline inventory, 1.5 times the baseline inventory, and 2.0 times the
baseline inventory. Each experiment included examination under the two treatments of
the scenario complexity factor, uncontested and contested, using the design in Table 2.

Table 2
Experimental Design for H2a, Increasing Quantity of Blue Aircraft
Scenario

Uncontested

Contested

Baseline inventory

XC11 , XD11

XC12 , XD12

Baseline * 1.5

XC21 , XD21

XC22 , XD22

Baseline *2.0

XC31 , XD31

XC32 , XD32

Condition

The associated alternative hypotheses are that as the quantity of Blue assets is
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and
contested scenarios:
H2a: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32
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The corresponding null hypotheses are that as the number of Blue assets is
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both the uncontested and
contested scenarios:
H2a0:

µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32

The second subpart of this research question is:
RQ2b: What is the effect of increasing the capability of the Blue assets on the
mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under
decentralized control?
To address RQ2b, focused on aircraft capability, the previously described JAEX
proficiency rating served as the independent variable. The proficiency ratings for the
Blue aircraft were modeled in JAEX at levels “E,” “C,” and “A,” in both the uncontested
and contested scenario complexity levels, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3
Experimental Design for H2b, Increasing Capability of Blue Assets
Scenario

Uncontested

Contested

Low Proficiency (“E”)

XC11 , XD11

XC12 , XD12

Medium Proficiency (“C”)

XC21 , XD21

XC22 , XD22

High Proficiency (“A”)

XC31 , XD31

XC32 , XD32

Condition

The associated alternative hypotheses are that as the capability of Blue assets is
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
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under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and
contested scenarios:
H2b: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32
The corresponding null hypotheses for H2b are that as the capability of Blue
assets is increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and
outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both the
contested and uncontested scenarios:
H2b0:

µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32

Degradation of centralized C2 node. The third and final research question
analyzes the impact of degrading the effectiveness of the centralized Blue C2 node. In an
operational scenario, this situation could be the result of Red air strikes, Red attacks using
cyberspace or directed energy weapons, or non-hostile causes such as a power outages or
natural disasters.
RQ3: What is the effect of degrading the capability of the Blue centralized C2
node on the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control?
For the purposes of this research, the Blue decentralized nodes retained their full
capabilities while the central node was degraded. In a real-world scenario, this
robustness of decentralized nodes could be attributed to proximity to their forces or to
their use of alternate, more resilient communications links. JAEX modeled the
degradation of the centralized node at four levels: full capacity (100%), slightly degraded
(80%), moderately degraded (60%), and severely degraded (40%). The experiment
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included examination under the two treatments of the scenario complexity factor,
uncontested and contested, using the design depicted in Table 4.

Table 4
Experimental Design for H3, Degradation of Centralized C2 Node
Uncontested

Contested

Fully Capable

XC11 , XD11

XC12 , XD12

Slight Degradation (80%)

XC21 , XD21

XC22 , XD22

Moderate Degradation (60%)

XC31 , XD31

XC32 , XD32

Severe Degradation (40%)

XC41 , XD41

XC42 , XD42

Condition

The associated alternative hypotheses are that as the Blue centralized node
becomes increasingly degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized
control and outcomes under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the
uncontested and contested scenarios:
H3:

µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 > µCD41 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32 > µCD42

The corresponding null hypotheses are as the capability of the Blue centralized C2
node is increasingly degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized
control and outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both
the contested and uncontested scenarios:
H30:

µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 ≤ µCD41 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32 ≤ µCD42
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Instrument Reliability
Field (2009) defines reliability as “the ability of a measure to produce consistent
results when the same entities are measured under different conditions” (pp. 792-793).
Using archery as an analogy, reliability would correspond to the grouping of arrows on
the target. Arrows clustered close together (irrespective of their distance from the
bullseye) would indicate high reliability. In this study, the JAEX model’s reliability was
demonstrated through camparing the distribution of the results of multiple runs of this
stochastic model against the expectation that these results would be approximately
normally distributed.
Instrument Validity
Field (2009) defines validity as “evidence that a study allows correct inferences
about the question it was aimed to answer” (p. 795). Using the archery analogy, high
validity would correspond to arrows landing close to the bulleye. Since the precise
location of the true bullseye is not generally known in many studies, validity tends to be a
challenging construct to measure, and there are a variety of different approaches to
assessing validity of a study or a test. The bullseye for the present research was
particulary challenging to identify; the true distribution for warfighting results is
generally unknown and, in fact, is indeterminate. Rather than focusing on specific
outcomes, as articulated in Chapter I, the present research proceeded on the assumption
that relative differences in model outcomes reflected relative differences in real-world
outcomes. Several validity challenges were addressed in this exploratory design,
including ecological validity, face validity, and external validity.
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Ecological validity relates to the bias that could be caused by the researcher’s
presence (Field, 2009, p. 12). For this study, an unbiased third-party John Tiller Software
associate assisted in executing the JAEX runs and recording the data, ensuring that the
researcher’s personal involvement did not influence the JAEX outcomes.
Babbie describes face validity as the quality of an indicator that makes it seem to
be a reasonable measure of some variable of interest (2013, p. 151). No wargaming
model can claim to be able to predict the outcome of a conflict with a high degree of
accuracy, but the JAEX model has been used under an Air Force Office of Scientific
Research contract for the purposes of education and experimental research. For this
study, the results of H1 can be assessed to establish a level of confidence in the trends
associated with the outcome difference between centralized control and decentralized
control outcomes, since under the far condition there should be minimal difference
between the two outcomes.
Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) define external validity as “… whether the
cause-effect relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables,
and measurement variable” (p. 38). External validity is a by-product of the quality of the
research design and by the robustness of the statistical tools used in the analysis. For the
given scenarios, this exploratory research assessed the impact of certain operational
scenarios on the decentralization of airpower C2. As will be discussed in Chapter V, the
present research provides opportunities for further research under other scenarios.
Treatment of the Data
Each combination of type of control, operational condition, and scenario
complexity generated 1,000 data points in JAEX. These data were captured in an Excel®
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database and downloaded into the IBM SPSS® version 25 Statistical Package for
analysis.
Descriptive statistics. The JAEX output data is synopsized in table form for each
of the three hypotheses, identifying the type of control, operational condition level,
scenario complexity level, mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and range.
Another table is used to display the outcome difference descriptive statistics, including
the mean and standard deviation for comparison with the theoretical mean and standard
deviation based on the theorem at Appendix B. The table also displays SPSS
computations of the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for the mean
outcome difference.
Hypotheses testing. This research effort leveraged Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) statistical test techniques using IBM’s SPSS to aid in assessing the four pairs
of null hypotheses. ANOVA is a mathematical tool used to determine whether there are
statistically significant differences between the means of three or more independent
groups (Laerd, 2016). The ANOVA procedure estimates the likelihood of the given
results given that the null hypothesis is true. In general, smaller variances in the
distributions enable greater discrimination between the means, hence the nomenclature
Analysis of Variance. An ANOVA result with p less than .05 indicates there is a less
than 1-in-20 chance of obtaining the given results, if in fact the null hypothesis were true;
therefore, the null hypotheses would be rejected. For this research, it was not sufficient
that the means are merely different since the hypotheses are directional, so the alternative
hypotheses means must decrease monotonically to reject the null hypotheses.
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The research effort employed the ANOVA techniques available in SPSS to assess
the hypotheses identified H1, H2a, H2b, and H3. Before conducting the ANOVAs, SPSS
generated partial boxplots of the data to enable a visual sense of the data, as
recommended by De Veaux, Velleman, and Bock (2012, p. 752). The partial boxplots
were based on a one-way ANOVA on the operational condition, providing a picture of
the differences in responses after removing the effects of the scenario complexity.
The ANOVA test requires satisfaction of six assumptions (De Veaux et al., 2012;
Laerd, 2016); for this research effort the first three assumptions were satisfied for all
hypotheses based on the model and research design:
1. The dependent variable must be continuous (either interval or ratio). JAEX
outcomes are generated in the form of real numbers on a continuous scale.
2. The independent variables (IVs) should consist of categorical, independent
groups. In the present research, for each of the hypothesis, the IVs were categorical (e.g.,
operational conditions in H1 were near, midrange, and far, and for all hypotheses the
scenario complexity levels were either uncontested or contested).
3. The observations should be independent, implying that there is no relationship
between the observations in each group or between the groups themselves. Within the
groups, each JAEX stochastically generated result is independent; the result in any
particular run of the model has no influence on other outcomes.
The remaining three assumptions required verification after data generation:
4. There should be no significant outliers. Presence of outliers in the generated
data was assessed graphically using boxplots generated with SPSS. The SPSS boxplots
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depict any data points over three-box-lengths away from the mean as an asterisk,
facilitating detection of any extreme outliers.
5. The dependent variable should be approximately normally distributed, meeting
the required nearly normal condition as described in De Veaux et al. (2012, pp. 728-729).
The outcome differences between the 1,000 runs of JAEX under centralized control and
those under decentralized control, each of which were normally distributed, should have
been, in theory, normally distributed, per the discussion at Appendix B. Assessment of
the near-normal assumption includes graphical assessment of the histogram and
probability-probability (P-P) plots generated in SPSS, and reference to the Shapiro-Wilk
test in SPSS®. Because the latter test is sensitive to minor deviations from the normal
distribution in large sample sizes (Field, 2009, p. 148), the assumption was assumed to
have been met given that two of these three methods supported the near-normality
assessment (Laerd, 2016).
6. The variances for each combination of groups of the two independent variables
should be homogeneous. Homogeneity of variance was assessed graphically using
clustered boxplots in SPSS and using Hartley’s Fmax test, which required that the greatest
variance be no more than three times greater than that of the least variance of the
distributions being tested in the ANOVA (Field, 2009, p. 151; Laerd Statistics, 2016).
The research design includes two factors: the operational condition and scenario
complexity. The intent of this design was to determine if the alternative hypotheses were
resilient under two different types of scenarios. A two-way ANOVA, under appropriate
conditions, provides an assessment of the effects of two independent categorical factors
on a dependent variable (Laerd, 2017). In this research, the operational condition and the
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scenario complexity served as the independent categorical factors, while the outcome
difference was the dependent variable. For a detailed discussion of the ANOVA
statistical techniques, see De Veaux, Velleman, and Bock (2012, Chapters 28 and 29),
Field (2009, Chapter 10), Laerd (2016) and Laerd (2017).
In the event that the homogeneity of variance requirement is not satisfied, as will
be seen to be the case in Chapter IV, Laerd suggests conducting two one-way ANOVAs
as an acceptable alternative to the two-way ANOVA (Laerd, 2017). This approach loses
some power for small sample sizes, since the two-way ANOVA takes advantage of
pooling of error terms, but for this research, sample size was not an issue. To retain the
overall probability of Type I error at .05, when conducting two one-way ANOVAs, the
value of p was set at .025.
The reporting of the statistical tests in Chapter IV includes the values of F(df1,
df2), p, and η2, where p is the significance level, and η2 is the estimate of the effect size in
the sample. As a reference, Field (2009) notes that η2 values of .01, .06, and .14 represent
small, medium, and large effects respectively (p. 389-390). The statistical test reporting
also includes results of post-hoc analyses and the observed power of the tests.
Summary
This research focuses on three hypotheses regarding decentralization of command
and control, derived from work by previous researchers, including Hinote (2009), Hukill
et al. (2012), and Betts (2014). This research effort employs the JAEX airpower model to
evaluate three basic hypotheses: the impact of geographic separation, the impact of
changing the quantity or quality of Blue assets, and the impact of degrading the capability
of the Blue centralized C2 node. The analysis evaluated each hypothesis under scenarios
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of differing complexity, uncontested and contested. The operational condition and
scenario complexity are the categorical independent variables in the study, and difference
in outcomes under centralized and decentralized control is the dependent variable. After
verifying the appropriate assumptions for the statistical tests, the research leveraged the
IBM SPSS® Statistics ANOVA feature to assess the change in mean outcome
differences. The JAEX model outcomes and the analysis of the data are reported in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
“This game is 90% mental. The other half is physical” (Yogi Berra, 1998, p. 89)
The purpose of this research effort is to quantitatively assess the impacts of
decentralizing the command and control of airpower under varying operational
conditions. The results of the analyses are presented incrementally, addressing each of
the hypotheses associated with the three operational conditions. Each section includes
descriptive statistics, assessment of the parametric test assumptions, and the hypothesis
test results.
Data Generation and Preparation
For each of the hypotheses (H1, H2a, H2b, and H3), the analyses required
construction of JAEX software scenario files for each combination of the independent
variables: operational condition level (which varied by hypothesis), scenario complexity
level (uncontested or contested), and type of control (centralized or decentralized). The
model executed 1,000 iterations for each of the resulting 46 scenario files, with the
outcome results placed into Excel® worksheets for importation into IBM’s SPSS®
Version 25 statistical software package.
The dependent variable of interest was the outcome difference, defined as the
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
control. The outcome difference is a continuous ratio variable (Field, 2009, p. 9); SPSS
computed this outcome difference for each level of each operational condition by
subtracting the decentralized outcome values from the corresponding centralized
outcomes, creating 1,000 outcome difference values for each operational condition.
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Valid ANOVA statistical tests require satisfaction of the assumptions outlined at
the end of the previous chapter (Laerd, 2018; De Veaux et al., 2012). Each section below
contains a discussion of the assumptions requiring analysis of the experimental data to
confirm.
Hypothesis 1: Geographic Separation
Hypothesis 1 in the study asserts that as the proportion of Blue assets that can
operate outside their assigned sector decreases (equivalently, that the increased separation
of geographic sectors limits a greater proportion of Blue assets to the sector in which they
are based), the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and
outcomes under decentralized control decreases. The associated null hypothesis is as the
proportion of assets that can operate outside their assigned sector decreases, there is no
significant change in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control
and outcomes under decentralized control. To test this hypothesis, the JAEX model
conducted 1,000 runs for each combination of the two types of control (centralized,
decentralized), three operational condition levels (near, mid, far), and two scenario
complexity levels (uncontested, contested).
Descriptive statistics. The 12,000 model runs yielded 6,000 outcome difference
values, derived by subtracting the decentralized outcomes from the centralized outcomes.
Table 5 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and range for each
combination of JAEX outcomes for scenario and condition.
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Table 5
H1 JAEX Outcomes
Scenario
Complexity

Operational
Condition

Uncontested

Near

Centralized

Uncontested

Near

Uncontested

Type of Control

M (SD)

Min.

Max.

Range

27436(1211)

23021

31263

8242

Decentralized

21837(1041)

18123

25169

7046

Mid

Centralized

26314(1025)

23230

30982

7752

Uncontested

Mid

Decentralized

21837(1041)

18490

24793

6303

Uncontested

Far

Centralized

21812(1076)

18295

25167

6872

Uncontested

Far

Decentralized

21815(1040)

18391

24524

6133

Contested

Near

Centralized

21879(3842)

6874

29759

22885

Contested

Near

Decentralized

14645(4738)

1873

24710

22837

Contested

Mid

Centralized

19665(3966)

7323

28218

20895

Contested

Mid

Decentralized

14634(4701)

2166

23367

21201

Contested

Far

Centralized

14679(4607)

2386

23240

20854

Contested

Far

Decentralized

14624(4668)

2323

24112

21789

Note: N = 1000 for all cases. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation

As discussed in Appendix A, each JAEX run produces an attrition-based
numerical result based on opponent’s assets damaged or destroyed. As an example, the
first line of Table 5 indicates that 1,000 runs of the JAEX model using centralized control
under uncontested conditions produced a mean Blue advantage of 27,436 points. The
results are approximately normally distributed, so the standard deviation is indicative of
the range, plus or minus the mean, into which 58% of the results fell. Under contested
conditions, the mean Blue advantage decreased, due to Red defensive efforts, while the
standard deviation increased, reflective of the greater number of aircraft and targets and
hence the number of stochastic events associated with each run of the model.
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The difference between the 1,000 pairs of runs under centralized and
decentralized control yielded a numeric outcome difference for each run. Table 6 shows
the mean and standard deviation of the outcome difference values produced under the
uncontested and contested scenarios, respectively, for the operational condition levels of
near, mid, and far. The theoretical outcome difference column in each table shows the
mean and standard deviation predicted by the theory of combining normal distributions as
described in Appendix B; the actual outcome difference column shows the mean and
standard deviation of the distribution of outcome differences for the 1,000 centralized and
decentralized outcomes from the appropriate rows in Table 5. As seen from the data in
Table 6, the actual outcome difference means and standard deviations agreed closely with
those of the theoretical outcome difference. The variances in Table 6 have been divided
by 103 for ease of display; as will be seen later, the divergence in the variances between
uncontested and contested scenarios created challenges in the planned two-way
ANOVAs. Table 6 also shows the 95% confidence interval for the mean of each of the
six outcome difference distributions. Figure 19 graphically depicts each of the means,
along with their 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 6
H1 Outcome Differences
Theoretical
Outcome
Difference
M (SD)

Actual
Outcome
Difference
M (SD)

Variance
(x10-3)

95% CI
for mean
lower
bound

95% CI
for mean
upper
bound

Scenario

Operational
Condition

Uncontested

Near

5599(1597)

5599(1577)

2487

5501

5696

Uncontested

Mid

4477(1567)

4477(1564)

2446

4380

4574

Uncontested

Far

-3(1496)

-3(1515)

2295

-97

91

Contested

Near

7234(6100)

7234(6212)

38589

6849

7620

Contested

Mid

5031(6150)

5031(6213)

38601

4650

5413

Contested

Far

55(6559)

54(6517)

42471

-350

458

Note: N = 1000 for all cases. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval

Figure 19. Clustered error bar mean chart for H1 outcome differences.
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Hypothesis testing for H1. The ANOVA tests were designed to determine if
there is significant difference between the mean outcome differences at each operational
condition level. Experiments were conducted with the geographic sectors set at near,
mid, and far. H1 asserts that as the proportion of Blue assets that can operate outside
their assigned sector decreases (equivalently, that the increased separation of geographic
sectors limits a greater proportion of Blue assets to the sector in which they are based),
the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under
decentralized control decreases monotonically in both the contested and uncontested
scenarios:
H1: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32
The associated null hypotheses are that as the proportion of assets that can operate
outside their assigned sector decreases, the mean difference between outcomes under
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or
increase, in both the uncontested and contested scenarios:
H10:

µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32

A two-way between-subjects ANOVA was planned to identify the significance of
the decrease in the mean outcome difference as the operational condition transitioned
from near, to midrange, to far, under both levels of scenario complexity. The next
section discusses the test assumptions and the results of the testing for H1.
ANOVA test assumptions. The experimental structure validated the first three of
the six ANOVA assumptions; this section addresses the three ANOVA assumptions that
relied on results from the data. For the near-normality assumption, Figures C1-C12 at
Appendix C show the histograms and P-P plots obtained from the outcome difference
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data. These graphs support the assertion that the data satisfied the requirement for near
normality; in addition, each of the outcome difference distributions met the requirements
of the Shapiro-Wilk normality test (p > .05).
Figure 20 displays the clustered boxplots for the H1 data. While there were some
data points that exceeded 1.5 box lengths from the edge of their box (indicated by circular
dots, along with their respective JAEX run number), there were no three-box-length
extreme outliers, which would have been indicated by an asterisk.

Figure 20. Clustered boxplot chart of H1 outcome differences.
The analysis considered two methodologies for assessing the requirement for
homogeneity of variance. First, the ratio of the largest variance (contested far) to
smallest variance (uncontested far) was 18.5, considerably exceeding the Hartley Fmax
limit of 3.0 (Field, 2009, p. 151). Second, De Veaux et al. (2012) recommend using a
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graphical assessment of the residuals to assess this assumption, arguing that if the
variance is constant, the plot should be patternless (p. 757). Figure 21 shows a scatterplot
of the residuals of the six outcome difference distributions; it is evident that the
distribution of residuals was distinctly different for the uncontested scenario outcomes
compared to the contested outcomes.

Figure 21. Scatterplot of outcome difference residuals versus predicted residuals.
The significant heterogeneity of variances, in which the variances of the outcome
difference distribution in the contested scenarios was significantly larger than that of the
uncontested scenarios, posed an impediment to the planned two-way ANOVA
procedures. In retrospect, since the uncontested and contested scenarios involved a
different mix of Blue and Red assets, it should not have been surprising that their
outcome differences would not be directly comparable. The challenge posed by the
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heterogeneity of variance obtained in the two different levels of scenario complexity will
be more fully addressed in the next chapter.
The violation of the requirement for homogeneity of variance necessitated an
alternative approach to the planned two-way ANOVA for statistical analysis. In lieu of
conducting a two-way ANOVA when the homogeneity of variance requirement is
violated, Laerd (2018, p. 14) recommends that separate one-way ANOVAs can be
conducted if the interaction plots are ordinal (that is, their lines do not cross), as is case
with the data in Figure 22. To keep the overall Type I error rate at .05 for the two oneway ANOVAs, the alpha for each of the one-way ANOVAs was set at 1 – .95 2 = .025
(Laerd, 2018, p. 15). The remainder of this section will discuss the one-way ANOVAs
for each level of scenario complexity.

Figure 22. Profile plots for H1 outcome differences.
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Uncontested scenario ANOVA. The data met the requirements for nearnormality and no outliers, as shown in the above section. The data demonstrated no
violation of the homogeneity of variances requirement, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax
value of 1.08, which was less than the upper limit of 3.0, and by Levene's test for equality
of variances (p = .574). Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome difference was found to be
statistically significant for different levels of operational condition, F(2, 2997) = 3646.5,
p < .001, η2 = .709. The observed power of the test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc
analysis revealed that all pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.
Details regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in Table 7.

Table 7
H1 Uncontested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Mean
Difference

Near

Mid
Far

1122
5601

.000
.000

941
5421

1303
5782

Mid

Near
Far

-1122
4480

.000
.000

-1303
4299

-941
4661

Far

Near
Mid

-5601
-4480

.000
.000

-5782
-4661

-5421
-4299

Sig

Note: Std Error = 69.4 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

Contested scenario ANOVA. The data met the requirements for near-normality
and no outliers. The data demonstrated no violation of the requirement for homogeneity
of variances within the contested scenario complexity levels, as assessed by the Hartley
Fmax value of 1.10, and by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = .304). Per the
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ANOVA, the mean outcome difference was statistically significant for different levels of
operational condition, F(2, 2997) = 341.5, p < .001, and η2 = .186. The observed power
of the test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise
comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001. Details regarding the post-hoc
analysis are provided in Table 8.

Table 8
H1 Contested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
97.5% CI
lower
bound

95% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Mean
Difference

Near

Mid
Far

2203
7180

.000
.000

1469
6447

2936
7913

Mid

Near
Far

-2203
4977

.000
.000

-2936
4244

-1469
5711

Far

Near
Mid

-7180
-4977

.000
.000

-7913
-5710

-6447
-4244

Sig

Note: Std Error = 281.5 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

H1 summary. The null hypotheses for both the uncontested and contested
scenarios under H1 were rejected; the alternative hypotheses were therefore supported.
Thus, as the proportion of Blue assets that can operate outside their assigned sector
decreased (equivalently, that the increased separation of geographic sectors limited a
greater proportion of Blue assets to the sector in which they were based), the difference
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control
decreased.
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Hypothesis 2a: Quantity of Blue Assets
As discussed in Chapter II, the study’s second hypothesis was split into two
hypotheses, one focused on increasing the number of Blue assets, the second on
increasing the capability of Blue assets. Hypothesis 2a asserts that as the quantity of Blue
aircraft increases, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and
outcomes under decentralized control decreases, in both the uncontested and contested
scenario conditions. The associated null hypothesis is that there will be no significant
change in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control as the quantity of Blue assets is increased. The analysis
assessed three operational condition levels: the baseline assets (1.0); a 50% increase in
assets (1.5); and a 100% increase in assets (2.0). To test this hypothesis, the JAEX model
conducted 1,000 runs for each combination of the two types of control (centralized,
decentralized), three operational condition levels (1.0, 1.5, and 2.0), and two scenario
complexity levels (uncontested, contested).
Descriptive Statistics. The 12,000 model runs (1000 of each combination of type
of control, operational condition, and scenario complexity) yielded 6,000 outcome
differences. Table 9 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and
range for each combination of JAEX outcomes for scenario complexity and operational
condition.
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Table 9
H2a JAEX Outcomes
Scenario
Complexity

Operational
Condition

Uncontested

1.0

Centralized

Uncontested

1.0

Uncontested

Type of Control

M (SD)

Min.

Max.

Range

36937(1450)

31584

40756

9172

Decentralized

21859(1055)

18622

25645

7023

1.5

Centralized

41220(1469)

36447

46217

9770

Uncontested

1.5

Decentralized

32779(1243)

29014

36945

7931

Uncontested

2.0

Centralized

43696(1515)

37960

48969

11009

Uncontested

2.0

Decentralized

43678(1493)

39011

48103

9092

Contested

1.0

Centralized

31999(3852)

17205

39702

22497

Contested

1.0

Decentralized

16744(3895)

3509

24053

20544

Contested

1.5

Centralized

38872(2454)

27260

45011

17751

Contested

1.5

Decentralized

30060(2636)

16426

36172

19746

Contested

2.0

Centralized

41122(2572)

31018

47486

16468

Contested

2.0

Decentralized

41108(2453)

32830

46782

13952

Note: N = 1000 for all cases. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation

Table 10 shows the mean and standard deviation of the JAEX outcomes produced
under the uncontested and contested scenarios, respectively, for the operational condition
levels of 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0. The theoretical outcome difference column in each table
shows the mean and standard deviation predicted by theory of combining normal
distributions as described in Appendix B; the actual outcome difference column shows
the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the outcome differences for the
1,000 centralized and decentralized outcomes from the corresponding rows in Table 9.
As shown in Table 10, the actual outcome difference distribution agreed closely with the
theoretical outcome difference. The variances have been divided by 10 3 for ease of
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display; once again, the divergence in the variances between uncontested and contested
scenarios created challenges in the planned two-way ANOVAs. Table 10 shows the 95%
confidence intervals for the means of the six outcome difference distributions. Figure 23
depicts each of the means, along with their 95% confidence intervals.

Table 10
H2a Outcome Differences

Scenario

Operational
Condition

Theoretical
Outcome
Difference
M (SD)

Actual
Outcome
Difference
M (SD)

Variance
(x10-3)

95% CI
for mean
lower
bound

95% CI
for mean
upper
bound

Uncontested

1.0

15077(1793)

15078(1808)

3269

14965

15190

Uncontested

1.5

8442(1924)

8442(1900)

3610

8324

8560

Uncontested

2.0

18(2127)

18(2127)

4524

-114

150

Contested

1.0

15255(5478)

15255(5305)

28143

14926

15584

Contested

1.5

8812(3601)

8812(3602)

12974

8588

9035

Contested

2.0

14(3554)

14(3507)

12299

-204

231

Note: N = 1000 for all cases. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval

Figure 23. Clustered error bar mean chart for H2a outcome differences.
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Hypothesis testing for H2a. Experiments were conducted with the number of
Blue assets set at 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0. H2a asserts that as the quantity of Blue assets is
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and
contested scenarios:
H2a: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32
The corresponding null hypotheses are that as the number of Blue assets is
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both the uncontested and
contested scenarios:
H2a0:

µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32

ANOVA test assumptions. The experimental structure validated the first three of
the six ANOVA assumptions; this section addresses the three ANOVA assumptions that
relied on results from the data. For the near-normality assumption, Figures C13-C24 at
Appendix C show the histograms and P-P plots obtained from the outcome difference
data for H2a. These graphs support the assertion that the requirement for near-normality
is met. The outcome difference distributions met the requirements of the Shapiro-Wilk's
normality test (p > .05), with the exceptions of uncontested 1.0 (p = .036) and contested
1.5 (p < .001). Field (2009) notes that Shapiro-Wilk can produce significant results from
small deviations from normality and recommends cross-checking with the histograms and
P-P plots (p. 144). In this case, the plots (C13-C14 and C21-C22) do not indicate nonnormality worthy of concern.
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For assessing the presence of outliers, Figure 24 displays the clustered boxplots
for the H2a data. While there are some data points that exceeded 1.5 box lengths from
the edge of their box (indicated by circular dots, along with their respective JAEX run
number), there were no three-box-length extreme outliers, which would have been
indicted by an asterisk.
For H2a, the data violated the homogeneity of variance requirement for the twoway ANOVA, as assessed by Levene’s test p < .001 and Hartley’s Fmax = 9.3. The
uncontested and contested interaction profile plots at Figure 25 are ordinal; as per the
rationale provided in the H1 discussion, the analysis proceeded using two one-way
ANOVAs, one for uncontested and another for contested scenarios, using α = .025 for
each test.

Figure 24. Clustered boxplot chart of H1 outcome differences.
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Figure 25. Profile plots for H2a outcome differences.

Uncontested scenario ANOVA. The data demonstrated no violation of the
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the uncontested scenario complexity
level, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.2. Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome
difference outcome was found to be statistically significant for different levels of
operational condition, F(2, 2997) = 3646.5, p < .001, η2 = .909. The observed power of
the test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise
comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001. Details regarding the post-hoc
analysis are provided in Table 11.
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Table 11
H2a Uncontested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Mean
Difference

1.0

1.5
2.0

6636
15060

.000
.000

6409
14833

6863
15287

1.5

1.0
2.0

-6636
8424

.000
.000

-6863
8197

-6409
8651

2.0

1.0
1.5

-15060
-8424

.000
.000

-15287
-8651

-14833
-8197

Sig

Note: Std Error = 87.2 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

Contested scenario ANOVA. The data demonstrated no violation of the
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the contested scenario complexity level,
as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.10. Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome
difference outcome was found to be statistically significant for different levels of
operational condition under the contested scenario, F(2, 2997) = 341.5, p < .001, η2 =
.687. The observed power of the test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis
revealed that all pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001. Details
regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in Table 12.
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Table 12
H2a Contested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Mean
Difference

1.0

1.5
2.0

6443
15241

.000
.000

5952
14750

6935
15733

1.5

1.0
2.0

-6443
8798

.000
.000

-6935
8306

-5952
9290

2.0

1.0
1.5

-15241
-8798

.000
.000

-15732
-9290

-14750
-8306

Sig

Note: Std Error = 188.7 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

H2a summary. The null hypotheses for both the uncontested and contested
scenarios under H2a were rejected; the alternative hypotheses were therefore supported.
Thus, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control decreased significantly as the number of Blue assets was
increased.
Hypothesis 2b: Capability of Blue Assets
Hypothesis 2b asserts that as the capability of Blue aircraft increases, the mean
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
control will become smaller, under both the uncontested and contested scenario
conditions. The associated null hypothesis is that there will be no significant difference
in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under
decentralized control as the capability of Blue aircraft increases. For this hypothesis, the
analysis varied the operational condition levels by adjusting the JAEX quality factor for
the aircraft. The three operational condition levels assessed included a basic level of
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capability (quality E), a moderate capability (quality C), and enhanced capability (quality
A). To test this hypothesis, the JAEX model conducted 1,000 runs for each combination
of the two types of control (centralized, decentralized), three operational condition levels
(quality-E, quality-C, and quality-A), and two scenario complexity levels (uncontested,
contested).
Descriptive statistics. The 12,000 model runs (1,000 of each combination of
type of control, operational condition, and scenario complexity) yielded 6,000 outcome
differences. Table 13 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and
range for each combination of JAEX outcomes for scenario and condition.
Table 13 shows the mean and standard deviation of the JAEX outcomes produced
under the uncontested and contested scenarios, respectively, for the operational condition
levels of quality-E, quality-C, and quality-A. The theoretical outcome difference column
in each table shows the mean and standard deviation predicted by theory of combining
normal distributions as described in Appendix B; the actual outcome difference column
shows the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the outcome differences for
the 1,000 centralized and decentralized outcomes from the appropriate rows in Table 13.
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Table 13
H2b JAEX Outcomes
Scenario
Complexity

Operational
Condition

Uncontested

Quality-E

Centralized

Uncontested

Quality-E

Uncontested

Type of Control

M (SD)

Min.

Max.

Range

12388(1368)

7270

17418

10148

Decentralized

7311(990)

4123

10242

6119

Quality-C

Centralized

18308(1317)

14150

22824

8674

Uncontested

Quality-C

Decentralized

14644(1148)

10749

17628

6879

Uncontested

Quality-A

Centralized

21887(1011)

18857

25721

6864

Uncontested

Quality-A

Decentralized

21797(1108)

18555

25859

7304

Contested

Quality-E

Centralized

5005(1925)

1260

11829

10569

Contested

Quality-E

Decentralized

1470(811)

91

5973

5882

Contested

Quality-C

Centralized

13386(2911)

4167

21786

17619

Contested

Quality-C

Decentralized

7039(3343)

1367

16981

15614

Contested

Quality-A

Centralized

16790(4007)

3978

23612

19634

Contested

Quality-A

Decentralized

16996(4034)

3324

24488

21164

Note: N = 1000 for all cases. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation

As seen from the data in Table 14, the actual outcome difference distribution
agreed closely with the theoretical outcome difference from the theory. The variances
have been divided by 103 for ease of display; the divergence in the variances between
uncontested and contested scenarios will create challenges in the planned two-way
ANOVAs. Table 14 also shows the 95% confidence interval for the mean of each of the
six outcome difference distributions. Figure 26 depicts each of the means, along with
their 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 14
H2b Outcome Differences
Theoretical Actual
Outcome
Outcome
Difference Difference
M (SD)
M (SD)

Variance
(x10-3)

95% CI
for mean
lower
bound

95% CI
for mean
upper
bound

Scenario

Operational
Condition

Uncontested

Quality-E

5077(1689)

5077(1648)

2716

4974

5179

Uncontested

Quality-C

3664(1748)

3664(1729)

2989

3557

3771

Uncontested

Quality-A

89(1500)

89(1517)

2301

-5

183

Contested

Quality-E

3535(2089)

3535(2067)

4272

3407

3663

Contested

Quality-C

6347(4433)

6347(4506)

20304

6067

6627

Contested

Quality-A

-206(5685)

-206(5662)

32058

-557

146

Note: N = 1000 for all cases. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval

Figure 26. Clustered error bar mean chart for H2b outcome differences.
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Hypothesis Testing for H2b. Experiments were conducted with the capabilty of
Blue assets set at Quality E, C, and A. H2b asserts that as the capability of Blue assets is
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and
contested scenarios:
H2b: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32
The corresponding null hypotheses for H2b are that as the capability of Blue
assets is increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and
outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both the
contested and uncontested scenarios:
H2b0:

µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32

ANOVA test assumptions. The experimental structure validated the first three of
the six ANOVA assumptions; this section addresses the three ANOVA assumptions that
relied on results from the data. For the near-normality assumption, Figures C25-C36 at
Appendix C show the histograms and P-P plots obtained from the outcome difference
outcome data for H2b. These graphs support the assertion that the requirement for nearnormality was met with Shapiro-Wilk's normality test (p > .05) with the exceptions of
contested quality-E (p < .001) and contested quality-C (p < .001). Field (2009) notes that
Shapiro-Wilk can produce significant results from small deviations from normality and
recommends cross-checking with the histograms and P-P plots. In this case, the plots
(C31-C32 and C33-C34) appeared to meet the near-normality requirement.
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For assessing the presence of outliers, Figure 27 displays the clustered boxplots
for the H2b data. Although some data points exceeded 1.5 box lengths from the edge of
their box, there were no 3-box-length extreme outliers, which would have been indicated
by an asterisk.

Figure 27. Clustered boxplot chart of H2b outcome differences.
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Figure 28. Profile plots for H2b outcome differences.

Uncontested scenario ANOVA. The data demonstrated no violation of the
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the uncontested scenario complexity
level, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.3. Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome
difference outcome was found to be statistically significant for different levels of
operational condition, F(2, 2997) = 2475.9, p < .001, η2 = .623. The observed power of
the test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise
comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001. Details regarding the post-hoc
analysis are provided in Table 15.
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Table 15
H2b Uncontested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Mean
Difference

Quality E

Quality C
Quality A

1414
4987

.000
.000

1222
4797

1603
5178

Quality C

Quality E
Quality A

-1412
3575

.000
.000

-1603
3384

-1222
3765

Quality A

Quality E
Quality C

-4987
-3575

.000
.000

-5178
-3765

-4797
-3384

Sig

Note: Std Error = 73.1 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

Contested scenario ANOVA. The data violated the requirement for homogeneity
of variances within the contested scenario complexity level, as assessed by the Hartley
Fmax value of 7.5. In lieu of the standard ANOVA, the Welch’s F test was performed, as
that test is robust under heterogeneity of variance (Field, 2009, p. 380). The mean
outcome difference outcome was found to be statistically significant for different levels
of operational condition under the contested scenario, F(2, 1677.4) = 412.0, p < .001, η2
= .276. The observed power of the test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis
revealed that all pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001. Details
regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in Table 16.
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Table 16
H2b Contested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Mean
Difference

Quality E

Quality C
Quality A

-2812
3741

.000
.000

-3318
3235

-2302
4247

Quality C

Quality E
Quality A

2812
6553

.000
.000

2306
6046

3318
7059

Quality A

Quality E
Quality C

-3741
-6553

.000
.000

-4247
-7059

-3235
-6046

Sig

Note: Std Error = 194.3 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

Although the means for H2b are significantly different, these data show that the
contested scenario outcome difference violated the directional hypothesis for H2b, since
the mean outcome difference for quality C represented a statistically significantly
increase over the outcome difference for quality E. This is contrary to the alternative
hypothesis that the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and
outcomes under decentralized control will decrease monotonically as quality of Blue
assets increases
The cause of this contrary result can be traced to unforeseen nonlinear impacts of
changes in capability values. The mean outcomes for both centralized and decentralized
control at quality C increased considerably over those at quality E; hence, their mean
difference also increased. Using an analogy from sports, consider two football teams that
have defeated a common opponent with results of 14-0 and 7-0, or a difference of 7
points. Increasing the capability of the players on both victorious teams might result in
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victories over the same opponent of 30-0 and 20-0, respectively. Although the difference
in margins of victory, 10 points, represents an increase over the previous difference, on a
normalized scale, the margin of victory represents a smaller percentage of total points
scored, 20% versus 33%, respectively.
The rejection of Hypothesis 2b for the contested scenario generated a search for a
method to re-express the dependent variable and revise the hypothesis accordingly. As
one of several possible methods to normalize the mean outcome differences, the analysis
proceeded by computing each outcome difference as the advantage of centralized control
over decentralized control, divided by the overall mean outcome under centralized and
decentralized control, calculated as a percentage. For outcomes in which centralized
control exceeded decentralized control, this percentage was positive; when decentralized
control outcomes exceeded centralized control, this percentage was negative. This
normalization of the data produced 1,000 new data points, each a normalized outcome
difference, expressed as a percentage. Subsequent references to the normalization
technique used in the study will be referred to as the mean centralized outcome
percentage advantage (or disadvantage) over the mean decentralized outcome.
The last column of Table 17 depicts the normalized outcome differences. The
fourth line of the table shows that for the contested scenario with Blue at quality E, the
mean centralized outcome percentage advantage over the mean decentralized control’s
outcome was 109%. For quality C, although the absolute mean outcome difference
showed an increase, that mean outcome difference reflected a 62% advantage over the
mean decentralized outcomes. Thus, the mean centralized control advantage had

120
diminished from 109% to 62%, even though the absolute difference between centralized
and decentralized mean outcomes increased.

Table 17
H2b Normalizing Outcome Differences
Mean
Mean
Centralized Decentralized
Outcome
Outcome

Mean
Mean
Outcome
Outcome
Difference

Mean
Normalized
Outcome
Difference
(Pct)

Scenario

Operational
Condition

Uncontested

Quality-E

12388

7311

9850

5077

52%

Uncontested

Quality-C

18308

14644

16476

3664

22%

Uncontested

Quality-A

21887

21797

21842

89

0%

Contested

Quality-E

5005

1470

3238

3535

109%

Contested

Quality-C

13386

7039

10213

6347

62%

Contested

Quality-A

16790

16996

16893

-206

-1%

Note:

Mean Outcome Difference = Mean Centralized Outcome – Mean Decentralized Outcome
Mean Outcome = (Mean Centralized Outcome + Mean Decentralized Outcome) / 2
Normalized Outcome Difference (Pct) = [Mean (Outcome Difference / Mean Outcome))] *100

This normalized re-expression of the H2b data points (De Veaux et al., 2012, p.
91) adjusts the outcome difference based on the size of the centralized and decentralized
outcomes. The re-expressed data yields the graphs in Figure 29, 30, and 31, which by
visual inspection, meet the directional requirement of the hypotheses. The subsequent
H2b hypothesis testing used the re-expressed data.
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Figure 29. Clustered error bar mean chart for H2b normalized outcome difference.

Figure 30. Clustered boxplot chart of H2b normalized outcome differences.
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Figure 31. Profile plots for H2b normalized outcome differences.
H2b ANOVA test assumptions for normalized outcome differences. For the
near-normality assumption, Figures C37-C48 at Appendix C show the histograms and PP plots obtained from the normalized outcome difference data for H2b. For the
uncontested scenario outcomes, the histograms, P-P plots, and Shapiro-Wilk test
indicated near-normality. For the contested scenarios, the histogram for quality E (Figure
C43) demonstrated some right skew issues, but overall the normalized outcome
difference plots indicated compliance with the near-normal condition requirement.
For assessing the presence of outliers, Figure 31 displays the clustered boxplots
for the normalized H2b data. While there were some data points that exceeded 1.5 box
lengths from the edge of their box (indicated by circular dots along with their respective
JAEX run number), there were no three-box-length extreme outliers, which would have
been indicted by an asterisk.
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As was the case with the previous hypotheses, the data violated the requirement
for homogeneity of variance for the two-way ANOVA, as assessed by Levene’s test p <
.001 and Hartley’s Fmax = 47.2. The uncontested and contested interaction profile plots at
Figure 32 are ordinal; as per the rationale provided in the H1 discussion, the analysis
proceeded using two one-way ANOVAs, one for uncontested and another for contested
scenarios, using α = .025 for each test.
Uncontested scenario ANOVA for normalized H2b. The normalized data
exhibited marginal compliance with the requirement for homogeneity of variances within
the uncontested scenario complexity levels, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 5.1,
which is somewhat higher than the recommended upper limit of 3. Per the ANOVA, the
mean normalized outcome difference was found to be statistically significant for different
levels of operational condition under the uncontested scenario, F(2, 2997) = 4506, p <
.001, η2 = .760. The Welch’s F, which is robust under heterogeneity of variance, was
also statistically significant, F(2,1812) = 4659.7, p < .001. The observed power of the
test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise comparisons
were statistically significant, p < .001; details are provided in Table 18.
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Table 18
H2b Uncontested Normalized Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
Mean
Difference

97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Quality E

Quality C
Quality A

29.3
51.1

.000
.000

27.9
49.7

30.7
52.5

Quality C

Quality E
Quality A

-29.3
21.8

.000
.000

-30.7
20.4

-27.9
23.2

Quality A

Quality E
Quality C

-51.1
-21.8

.000
.000

-52.5
-23.2

-49.7
-20.4

Sig

Note: Std Error = 0.54 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

Contested scenario ANOVA for normalized H2b. The normalized data did not
violate the requirement for homogeneity of variances within the contested scenario
complexity levels, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.3. Per the ANOVA, the
mean normalized outcome difference was found to be statistically significant for different
levels of operational condition under the contested scenario, F(2, 2997) = 1289, p < .001,
η2 = .502. The observed power of the test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis
revealed that all pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001. Details
regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in Table 19.
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Table 19
H2b Contested Normalized Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
Mean
Difference

97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Quality E

Quality C
Quality A

47.1
110.4

.000
.000

41.4
104.7

52.7
116.1

Quality C

Quality E
Quality A

-47.1
63.4

.000
.000

-52.7
57.7

-41.3
69.1

Quality A

Quality E
Quality C

-110.4
-63.4

.000
.000

-116.1
-69.1

-104.7
-57.7

Sig

Note: Std Error = 2.18 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

H2b summary. The original H2b hypotheses were partly supported. The null
hypothesis for the uncontested scenarios under H2b was rejected; however, the
directional null hypothesis for the contested scenarios could not be rejected. This
necessitated an adjustment to the hypotheses, using a normalized outcome difference as
the dependent variable. With this revision to the hypothesis, it can be asserted that the
normalized mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control decreased significantly as the capability of Blue assets was
increased.
Hypothesis 3: Reduction in Centralized C2 Node’s Capability
Hypothesis 3 asserts that as the centralized node becomes increasingly degraded
at executing the C2 mission, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized
control and outcomes under decentralized control will decrease, in both the uncontested
and contested scenario conditions. The associated null hypothesis is that there will be no
significant difference in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control
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and outcomes under decentralized control as the centralized node becomes less effective.
The analysis included four operational condition levels: full capacity (100%), slightly
degraded (80%), moderately degraded (60%), and severely degraded (40%). The
hypothesis testing required 10,000 runs of the JAEX model; at each of the two scenario
complexity levels there were four levels of centralized control, with one decentralized
level against which they were compared.
Descriptive statistics. The 10,000 model runs yielded 5,000 outcome differences
between centralized and decentralized control outcomes. Table 20 shows the mean,
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and range for each combination of JAEX
outcomes for scenario and condition.

Table 20
H3 JAEX Outcomes
Scenario
Complexity

Operational
Condition

Uncontested

100%

Centralized

Uncontested

80%

Uncontested

Type of Control

M (SD)

Min.

Max.

Range

21777(1052)

17478

25551

8073

Centralized

18238(1116)

14862

22886

8024

60%

Centralized

14534(1102)

10945

18312

7367

Uncontested

40%

Centralized

10920(1090)

7355

15191

7836

Uncontested

100%

Decentralized

14583(1161)

10630

17821

7191

Contested

100%

Centralized

17078(3682)

4038

24785

20747

Contested

80%

Centralized

12711(3729)

2791

20842

18051

Contested

60%

Centralized

8985(3141)

1920

16942

15022

Contested

40%

Centralized

5499(2330)

1204

12035

10831

Contested

100%

Decentralized

7036(3213)

1520

15795

14275

Note: N = 1000 for all cases. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation
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Table 21 shows the mean and standard deviation of the JAEX outcomes produced
under the uncontested and contested scenarios, respectively, for the operational condition
levels of 100%, 80%, 60%, and 40%. The theoretical outcome difference column in each
table shows the mean and standard deviation predicted by theory of combining normal
distributions as described in Appendix B; the actual outcome difference column shows
the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the outcome differences for the
1,000 centralized and decentralized outcomes from the appropriate rows in Table 20. As
seen from the data in Table 21, the actual outcome difference distribution agreed closely
with the theoretical outcome difference from the theory. The variances have been
divided by 103 for ease of display; once again the divergence in the variances between
uncontested and contested scenarios will create challenges in the planned two-way
ANOVAs. Table 21 also shows the 95% confidence interval for the mean of each of the
eight outcome difference distributions. Figure 32 depicts each of the means, along with
their 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 21
H3 Outcome Differences
Scenario
Operational
Complexity Condition

Theoretical
Outcome
Difference
M (SD)

Actual
Outcome
Difference
M (SD)

Variance
(x10-3)

95% CI
for mean
lower
bound

95% CI
for mean
upper
bound

Uncontested

100%

7194(1567)

7194(1568)

2459

7097

9291

Uncontested

80%

3655(1610)

3655(1579)

2493

3557

3753

Uncontested

60%

-48(1601)

-48(1626)

2644

-149

53

Uncontested

40%

-3662(1592)

-3662(1553)

2412

-3759

-3566

Contested

100%

10043(4887)

10043(5009)

25090

9732

10353

Contested

80%

5675(4923)

5675(4886)

23873

5372

5978

Contested

60%

1919(4493)

1919(4561)

20803

1636

2202

Contested

40%

-1537(3969)

-1537(3993)

15944

-1785

-1289

Note: N = 1000 for all cases. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval

Figure 32. Clustered error bar mean chart for H3 outcome differences.
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Hypothesis testing for H3. Each continuous dependent variable outcome
difference was associated with the independent categorical variables scenario complexity
(contested, uncontested) and operational condition (100%, 80%, 60%, 40%). The
alternative hypotheses for H3 are that as the Blue centralized node becomes increasingly
degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and
contested scenarios:
H3:

µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 > µCD41 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32 > µCD42

The corresponding null hypotheses are as the capability of the Blue centralized C2
node is increasingly degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized
control and outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both
the contested and uncontested scenarios:
H30:

µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 ≤ µCD41 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32 ≤ µCD42

ANOVA test assumptions. The experimental structure validated the first three of
the six ANOVA assumptions; this section addresses the three ANOVA assumptions that
relied on results from the data. For the near-normality assumption, Figures C49-C64 at
Appendix C show the histograms and P-P plots obtained from the outcome difference
data for H3. These graphs support the assertion that the requirement for near normality
was met. The uncontested outcome difference distributions met the requirements of the
Shapiro-Wilk's normality test (p > .05). The contested outcome distributions tested as
significant under Shapiro-Wilk (p < .001). Shapiro-Wilk can produce significant results
with small deviations from normality (Field, 2009, p. 144); cross-checking with the
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histograms and P-P plots at Figures C57-C64 did not reveal non-normalities worthy of
concern.
For assessing the presence of outliers, Figure 33 displays the clustered boxplots
for the H3 data. While there are some data points that exceeded 1.5 box lengths from the
edge of their box (indicated by circular dots, along with their respective JAEX run
number), there were no three-box-length extreme outliers, which would have been
indicted by an asterisk.

Figure 33. Clustered boxplot chart of H3 outcome differences.

The H3 data violated the requirement for homogeneity of variance for the twoway ANOVA as assessed by Levene’s test, p < .001 and Hartley’s Fmax = 10.2. The
uncontested and contested interaction profile plots for at Figure 34 are ordinal; as per the
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rationale provided in the H1 discussion, the analysis proceeded using two one-way
ANOVAs, one for uncontested and another for contested scenarios, using α = .025 for
each test.

Figure 34. Profile Plots for H3.
Uncontested scenario ANOVA. The data exhibited compliance with the
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the uncontested scenario complexity
levels, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.0. Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome
difference was found to be statistically significant for different levels of operational
condition, F(3, 3996) = 8766, p < .001, η2 = .868. The observed power of the test was
greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise comparisons were
statistically significant, p < .001. Details regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in
Table 22.
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Table 22
H3 Uncontested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Mean
Difference

100%

80%
60%
40%

3539
7243
10857

.000
.000
.000

3340
7043
10657

3738
7442
11056

80%

80%
60%
40%

-3539
3704
7318

.000
.000
.000

-3738
3504
7118

-3340
3903
7517

60%

80%
60%
40%

-7243
-3704
3614

.000
.000
.000

-7442
-3903
3415

-7043
-3504
3813

40%

80%
60%
40%

-10857
-3539
-3614

.000
.000
.000

-11056
-7517
-3813

-10657
-7118
-3415

Sig

Note: Std Error = 70.7 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

Contested scenario ANOVA. The data exhibited compliance with the
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the contested scenario complexity
levels, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.5. Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome
difference was found to be statistically significant for different levels of operational
condition under the contested scenario, F(3, 3996) = 1156, p < .001, η2 = .465. The
observed power of the test was greater than .99. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all
pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001. Details regarding the posthoc analysis are provided in Table 23.
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Table 23
H3 Contested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons
97.5% CI
lower
bound

97.5% CI
upper
bound

Operational
Condition

Operational
Condition

Mean
Difference

100%

80%
60%
40%

4367
8124
11579

.000
.000
.000

3784
7540
10996

4951
8707
12163

80%

80%
60%
40%

-4367
3756
7212

.000
.000
.000

-4951
3173
6629

-3784
4340
7796

60%

80%
60%
40%

-8124
-3756
3456

.000
.000
.000

-8707
-4340
2872

-7540
-3173
4039

40%

80%
60%
40%

-11579
-7212
-3456

.000
.000
.000

-12163
-7796
-4039

-10996
-6629
-2872

Sig

Note: Std Error = 207.0 for all cases. Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval

H3 summary. The null hypotheses for both the uncontested and contested
scenarios under H3 were rejected; the alternative hypotheses were therefore supported.
Thus, it can be asserted that the mean outcome difference between centralized and
decentralized control decreased significantly as the Blue centralized node was degraded.
Summary of Results
The purpose of this research effort is to quantitatively assess the impacts of
decentralizing the command and control of airpower under varying operational
conditions. More specifically, the research assesses the impacts that varying particular
operational conditions have on the mean difference between outcomes under centralized
control and outcomes under decentralized control.
For the first operational condition considered, as the proportion of range-limited
Blue aircraft was increased, or, equivalently, the geographic separation between the
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sectors was increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control
and outcomes under decentralized control became smaller, as hypothesized. This effect
held for both the uncontested and contested scenarios.
The second set of hypotheses was divided into two subparts. For the first subpart,
as hypothesized, as the number of Blue aircraft was increased, the mean difference
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control
became smaller. This effect held for both the uncontested and contested scenarios. For
the second subpart, as hypothesized, in the uncontested scenario, as the capability of Blue
aircraft was increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control
and outcomes under decentralized control became smaller. However, for the contested
scenario, the mean outcome differences did not decrease monotonically as the capability
of the Blue assets increased. A revised hypothesis was introduced, in which the mean
outcome differences were converted to the percentage advantage of centralized versus
decentralized control. Testing this revised hypothesis demonstrated that normalized
mean outcome differences did become significantly smaller monotonically as the Blue
aircraft capability increased.
For the final set of hypotheses, as the Blue’s centralized node became
increasingly degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control
and outcomes under decentralized control became smaller. At approximately 50%
capacity, the mean outcome difference became negative, indicating that airpower being
orchestrated by the reduced capacity centralized node had worse outcomes than
operations under decentralized control. This effect held for both the uncontested and
contested scenarios.
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The implications of this research for the command and control of airpower will be
discussed in the next chapter. Chapter V also presents a more robust discussion of the
differences observed between the uncontested and contested scenario distributions and
will amplify the discussion of normalizing outcome differences.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
“Essentially all models are wrong, but some are useful.”
George Box (Champkin, 2013, p. 1)

This research used data generated by the airpower combat model JAEX to explore
the effect of varying specific operational conditions on the mean difference between
outcomes conducted under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control.
As Box argues in this chapter’s epigraph, no model can claim complete accuracy in
replicating or predicting reality; yet models can still provide useful insights into
challenging problems. This chapter will discuss how the research can expand the body of
knowledge in the methodological and military command and control arenas, after
providing an analysis of the results of the hypothesis testing.
Discussion of Hypotheses Results
The results of the study showed that, under the given conditions, the mean
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
control of airpower was significantly affected by operational conditions. For this study,
in each of the baseline conditions, the mean centralized control outcomes indicated an
advantage over the mean decentralized control outcomes. The magnitude of this
advantage decreased as the operational condition was varied from the baseline condition.
In the course of gathering and analyzing the data, three key issues merited additional
discussion.
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First, the initial experimental design included a plan for two-way ANOVA to
demonstrate some robustness of the theory under scenarios of differing complexity. De
Veaux, Velleman, and Bock (2012, p. 750-751) provide an illustrative example of an
application of two-way ANOVA using the game of darts. In their example, the accuracy
of the dart thrown is a factor of two independent categorical variables, the distance the
thrower stands from the board and which hand is used to throw the dart. The dependent
variable, accuracy, is the miss distance from the target bullseye. The illustrative example
includes an analysis of the effects of the levels of each independent variable, and any
interactions between the two variables.
However, there was a key difference between this research and the dart board
experiment described by De Veaux, Velleman, and Bock (2012). In the dart board
example, the accuracy was measured the same regardless of the distance the thrower is
standing from the dart board or which hand the thrower uses to launch the dart. In the
present research, the JAEX uncontested scenario employed a different mixture of assets
from the uncontested scenario, resulting in not just different outcome differences but
significantly different variances of the distributions; in all cases the data violated the
assumption of homogeneity of variances required for a two-way ANOVA, requiring an
alternative analysis methodology. The inability to directly compare the uncontested and
contested scenario outcomes using two-way ANOVA statistical techniques became
obvious only in retrospect. The additional Red assets and the attrition they imposed on
Blue in the contested scenarios significantly changed not only the mean difference
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control,
but also their variances. The inability to use the planned two-way ANOVA to show
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statistical significance of the trends in the mean outcome differences under both scenario
complexities turned out to be an inconvenience rather than a significant concern, since all
the experimental results, after being normalized, supported the alternative hypotheses.
A second insight, which follows directly from the first, was the need to normalize
the H2b data in order to reject the null hypothesis in the contested scenario. A natural
question that arises is whether normalized data would have supported the other
hypotheses. Among several possible approaches to normalizing the outcome differences,
this research proceeded by re-expressing the dependent variable as the ratio of the
outcome difference and the overall mean outcome, expressed as a percentage. The
normalization results were expressed as the mean centralized control’s outcome
percentage advantage (or disadvantage) over the mean decentralized control’s outcome.
The discussions of each operational condition below include a graphical assessment of
each of the hypotheses using normalized data to demonstrate that the normalization
technique has general applicability, rather than being an artifact of the H2b conditions.
Third, it is important to note that each hypothesis considered in this research has
an implied inverse hypothesis. Although the experiments in this research adjusted the
operational conditions in a direction that reduced the mean difference between outcomes
under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control, reversing the
direction of the operational condition adjustments would have increased the mean
difference in outcomes under the two types of control. These inverse hypotheses are of
particular applicability in real-world situations. For example, under the conditions of
H2a, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes
under decentralized control decreased as the number of assets increased. The data
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supports a conclusion that the inverse is also true: as assets became scarcer, the advantage
of centralized control over decentralized control became more pronounced. The finite
availability of airpower matched with large requirements generally result in airpower
being in short supply; airpower advocates have often argued that the scarcity of airpower
is a key rationale for centralized control (Momyer, 1975). The experimental data
confirmed that as Blue inventories were reduced, centralized control became more
valuable. Similar results were obtained from inverse hypotheses regarding an increase in
the percentage of Blue assets with long range reductions in the capability of Blue aircraft
and increases in the resiliency of the centralized C2 node. The sections on each
operational condition below include a discussion of the dual interpretation of results.
Hypothesis 1: Range limitations on Blue aircraft. The null hypotheses for both
the uncontested and contested scenarios were rejected, leading to acceptance of the
alternative hypotheses. For model runs that increased the proportion of range-limited
Blue aircraft, or, equivalently increased the geographic separation between the sectors,
the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under
decentralized control became smaller.
Impact of normalizing the data. Figures 35 and 36 compare boxplots and
estimated marginal means for absolute outcome differences and normalized differences,
both of which support the alternative hypotheses. For the near condition, centralized
control yielded an approximate 20% advantage over decentralized control in the
uncontested scenario and 40% advantage in the contested scenario. These advantages
dropped monotonically to near zero for both scenario complexities in the far scenario.
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Figure 35. Comparison of clustered boxplot charts for absolute (top) and normalized
(bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 1.
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Figure 36. Comparison of estimated marginal means charts for absolute (top) and
normalized (bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 1.
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Implications of dual interpretations of the data. The inverse of H1, also
supported by the results, shows that the closer two operating areas are to each other, the
greater the advantage provided by centralized control. This is equivalent to asserting that
the higher the proportion of Blue air assets that can range the entire Red target set, the
greater the advantage provided by centralized control. The ability to range the entire
target set could be a function of geographic proximity or due to extended range of
attacking aircraft. If a low percentage of assets can range the entire target set, centralized
control provides little advantage over decentralized control. The results indicated that,
under the modeled conditions, centralized control yielded a 20% advantage over
decentralized control when all Blue air assets could reach all Red targets in the
uncontested scenario; this advantage was 40% in the contested scenario. A practical
application includes use of air refueling to extend the range of aircraft; operating under
centralized control better takes advantage of the ability to reach high-priority Red targets
than under decentralized control.
Hypothesis 2a: Increased number of Blue aircraft. For both the uncontested
and contested scenarios, the null hypotheses were rejected, leading to acceptance of the
alternative hypotheses. As the number of Blue aircraft was increased, the mean
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized
control became monotonically smaller.
Impact of normalizing the data. The non-normalized outcome differences
supported the alternative hypotheses. Figures 37 and 38 compare boxplots and estimated
marginal means for absolute outcome differences and normalized differences. Both
figures show close alignment between the non-normalized mean outcome difference and
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the normalized outcome difference. Centralized control yielded an approximate 50%
advantage over decentralized control in the 1.0 condition in the uncontested scenario, and
60% advantage in the contested scenario; these advantages dropped to near zero when
Blue assets were doubled for both scenario complexities. A possible explanation for this
effect lies in the capability of a large inventory to effectively achieve effects against
targets in its respective sector without needing the concentration of effort that
centralization provides.
Implications of dual interpretations of the data. The inverse of H2a, also
supported by the results, shows that as Blue assets become scarcer, the greater the
advantage provided by centralized control. The results indicate that, under the modeled
conditions, as available Blue assets were reduced by half, then centralized control yielded
a 50% advantage over decentralized control in the uncontested scenario, and 60%
advantage in the contested scenario. Practical applications can reflect attrition of assets,
redeployment of forces to handle another contingency, or the reality that some proportion
of Blue air assets are one-time-use, such as cruise missiles which, after being expended,
are no longer available for subsequent use. As the Blue inventory is drawn down,
centralized control enables a more optimum use of remaining assets.
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Figure 37. Comparison of clustered boxplot charts for absolute (top) and normalized
(bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 2a.
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Figure 38. Comparison of estimated marginal means charts for absolute (top) and
normalized (bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 2a.
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Hypothesis 2b: Increased capability of Blue aircraft. For the uncontested
scenario, the null hypothesis was rejected. For the contested scenario, however, in
contradiction to the alternative hypothesis, the mean absolute outcome difference did not
decrease monotonically as the capability of the Blue assets increased. Specifically,
setting the Blue capability at the midrange value of Quality C in the contested scenario
produced an increase in the mean outcome difference, as was shown graphically in Figure
28.
Impact of normalizing the data. Figures 39 and 40 compare boxplots and
estimated marginal means for absolute outcome differences and normalized differences.
The re-expressed, normalized data supported the alternative hypotheses that the mean
outcome difference decreased monotonically as the capability of the Blue assets
increased for both the uncontested and contested scenarios. With Blue assets assigned
quality E, centralized control yielded an approximate 50% advantage over decentralized
control when uncontested, and 100% advantage in the contested scenario; these
advantages were reduced to near zero when Blue assets were at quality A, the model’s
highest level.
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Figure 39. Comparison of clustered boxplot charts for absolute (top) and normalized
(bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 2b.
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Figure 40. Comparison of estimated marginal means charts for absolute (top) and
normalized (bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 2b.
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Implications of dual interpretations of the data. The inverse of H2b shows that
as Blue is equipped with less-capable assets, the advantage provided by centralized
control increases. Starting from Blue Quality A, in which there is near-zero advantage in
centralized control, as the Blue asset quality was degraded to Quality E, centralized
control yielded an approximate 50% advantage over decentralized control when
uncontested and 100% advantage in the contested scenario. Similar to the results of H2a
with reduced quantity, for assets of much lower quality there is less slack in the system,
and centralized control is better able to ensure best use of the reduced-quality assets. A
practical application can reflect deployment of high-quality aircraft to another region, or
long-term attrition of top-quality airframes and well-trained crews during a protracted
conflict, as was the case for the air forces of both Germany and Japan during WWII
(Overy, 1980, p. 144).
Hypothesis 3: Degradation of Blue centralized control capability. For both
the uncontested and contested scenarios, the null hypotheses were rejected, leading to
acceptance of the alternative hypotheses. As the Blue centralized node’s capability to
execute the C2 function became degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control became significantly
smaller. Below approximately 50% capacity, the centralized node produced worse mean
outcomes than operations under decentralized control, under both uncontested and
contested scenarios.
Impact of normalizing the data. Both the absolute and normalized outcome
difference data supported the alternative hypotheses that as the centralized node becomes
degraded, the advantage of centralized control diminishes. There is reasonably close
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alignment between the absolute and normalized boxplots and estimated marginal means,
as seen in Figures 41 and 42. A unique aspect of the H3 operational condition was that
the centralized node degraded to a point beyond which it operated at a disadvantage to
decentralized control. For the modeled conditions, the breakeven point was in the 50%
range, below which the centralized node was outperformed by the decentralized nodes.
When fully capable, centralized control exhibited an approximate 40% advantage over
decentralized in the uncontested scenario and 80% in the contested scenario. When the
Blue C2 node was reduced to 40% capacity, centralized control yielded an approximate
20% disadvantage under both the uncontested and contested scenarios.
Implications of dual interpretations of the data. The inverse of H3 shows that as
the Blue centralized C2 node becomes more capable, the greater its advantage over
decentralized control, all other things being equal. The results supported the hypothesis
that a centralized node operating at 100% will have a greater advantage over
decentralized control than a degraded centralized C2 node. In this experiment, a poorly
functioning centralized C2 node operated at a disadvantage compared to the decentralized
nodes. When fully functional, the centralized C2 node yielded an approximate 40%
advantage in centralized control over decentralized in the uncontested scenario and 80%
advantage in the contested scenario. A practical application can reflect a disorganized
start with a dysfunctional command structure; as the centralized node builds its
capability, it will begin to outperform the disparate efforts of the decentralized nodes.
The allied experience in North Africa in WWII, as discussed in Chapter II, reflects such a
disorganized start, with subsequent alterations that emphasized a more centralized C2
structure.
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Figure 41. Comparison of clustered boxplot charts for absolute (top) and normalized
(bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 3.
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Figure 42. Comparison of estimated marginal means charts for absolute (top) and
normalized (bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 3.
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Conclusions
The normalized results of this study supported the three basic hypotheses posed in
Chapter I. The results were consistent across notional uncontested and contested
scenarios, demonstrating a level of robustness of the research and providing some
assurance that the results were not an artifact of the experiment’s structure or
serendipitous initial conditions. Beyond the statistical significance of the outcomes, the
graphical representations of the results show useful trends in the mean difference between
outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control. This study
has several areas of theoretical and practical application that add to the body of
knowledge regarding command and control of airpower, as discussed below.
Generalizations: Theoretical contributions. The first theoretical contribution
of the study concerns the calculation of the dependent variable in the study, the difference
in JAEX outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control.
Appendix B describes how combining data from two normal distributions through
addition or subtraction produces normally distributed data. This property was used to
enable parametric statistical analyses to examine the output of two systems that produce
near-normally distributed data by combining them into a single, near-normally distributed
data set. This study appears to be original in applying this property to the analysis of the
modeled outcomes. The framework developed for this study could be used for future
experiments in which normally distributed outcomes are generated by simulations.
A second generalization concerns the nonlinearities encountered in the contested
scenario of H2b. This unanticipated outcome served as a reminder that warfare itself is
chaotic and nonlinear, as was asserted by Clausewitz (1976 translation). This result also
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is a case where results that are contrary to expectations can add to the body of
knowledge. As it happened, the nonlinearities in H2b brought to light the unanticipated
need to normalize the data in order to achieve alignment with the hypotheses. These
normalized results, expressed as centralized control’s mean percentage advantage or
disadvantage over decentralized control, provided a more intuitive picture of the impacts
than expressing the results as absolute JAEX numerical outcomes.
Finally, the methodology used in this study can be generalized beyond the realm
of military command and control; the framework can be used for sensitivity analysis for
decentralization options in business or governmental structures in which there are
pressures to centralize or decentralize activities or production capabilities. The
methodology requires that the centralized and decentralized system outputs can be
stochastically modeled. Possible non-military applications include assessing centralized
management and decentralization of some production activities in a business (Haas, Riis,
& Hvolby, 1998; Morgan, 1997) or balancing centralization and decentralization of
police operations (Kurtz, 1995).
Generalizations: Practical contributions. This study’s results support several
practical generalizations regarding decentralization of airpower C2 for consideration by
practitioners in the field:


Centralized control’s initial advantage in using Blue aircraft to attack the
highest-priority Red targets is significantly reduced as the proportion of Blue
aircraft that can reach targets outside their assigned sector is reduced. In this,
the first experiment, a Blue force with a high percentage of longer-range
assets exhibited an advantage, ranging from 20% to 40% depending on
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scenario complexity, when centrally controlled. As the proportion of shortrange assets increased, the advantage was monotonically reduced to nil. Thus,
a Blue force consisting of short-range assets can be effectively managed in a
decentralized manner, but a force with significant long-range capability is
more effective when centrally controlled.


The initial advantage provided by centralized control in managing scarce or
lower-capability assets is significantly reduced as each Blue sector is provided
larger numbers or higher-quality assets to prosecute targets in its own
assigned Red sector. In the second experiment, the initial Blue centralized C2
advantage, ranging from 50% to 60% depending on scenario complexity,
monotonically dropped to nil as the Blue inventory was doubled. For the
experiment in which Blue asset capability was increased, the initial Blue
centralized C2 advantage, ranging from 50% to 110% depending on scenario
complexity, dropped to nil when the modeled capability of Blue aircraft was
increased from low to high quality. Thus, the advantage provided by
centralized control in managing scarce or lower-capability assets was negated
when each Blue sector was provided assets of sufficient quantity or quality to
prosecute all targets in its respective Red sector. The increase in numbers and
capability must come from other operating areas, so the military and political
leadership must assess the opportunity cost associated with making each Blue
decentralized sector self-sufficient.



The initial advantage provided by centralized control in managing assets is
significantly reduced as the centralized node’s capability is degraded. In the
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third experiment, the initial centralized C2 advantage, ranging from 50% to
110% depending on scenario complexity, monotonically dropped to -20%
(indicating Red advantage) as the Blue C2 was severely degraded. Thus, the
severely degraded Blue centralized C2 node generated less effective airpower
than the combined airpower generated by the Blue decentralized C2 nodes.
Several insights stem from the unexpected nonlinearity identified in the contested
scenario of H2b, which would not have been apparent had the experiment examined only
two levels of the operational condition, or if only the uncontested scenario had been
modeled. First, experiments that yield unexpected results can add to the body of
knowledge of a subject more than those in which the results match expectations. The
identification of the cause of the nonlinearity led to development of the normalization
technique which provided a more intuitive description of the results than did the original
depiction of the data in absolute terms. A second insight is that the Blue force with low
capability levels exhibited only a marginal advantage over its Red adversary, under both
centralized and decentralized control. Moderately increasing the Blue capability
significantly enhanced the Blue advantage over Red. Finally, the nonlinearity serves as a
reminder that C2 structures merit continual evaluation as a conflict unfolds. This need to
continually evaluate C2 structures has practical implications. As an example, the theater
JFACC model instituted in the Central Command region in the early 2000’s enabled one
air commander to oversee airpower operations across the theater, including airpower
support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lambeth, 2005). As the two conflicts
developed on timelines that significantly exceeded initial expectations, however, a
tailored, hybrid C2 structure eventually evolved, with some airpower support
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decentralized to the subordinate joint force commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan (Hukill
et al., 2012).
Recommendations
This section outlines recommendations for airpower C2 practitioners, provides a
suggestion for expanding on an analysis technique used in this research methodology for
this study, and proposes areas for future research to extend this study.
Recommendations for airpower C2 practitioners. This study adds to the body
of knowledge upon which commanders rely, augmented by personal experience and
understanding of the situation, to decide on appropriate airpower C2 arrangements.
Combined with other assessments, the results of this study can provide input into the
myriad factors that commanders consider when designing C2 structures. Such structures
invariably involve decisions regarding the appropriate levels of centralization and
decentralization for various assets and mission types. For example, command and control
of strategic assets may be highly centralized, while those assets performing close air
support may be more decentralized (Hinote, 2009).
One way to demonstrate and disseminate the insights from this study is through
professional military education venues. The study provides a framework for training and
education of practitioners in the C2 of airpower. Professional military education’s
treatment of airpower C2 can include doctrine, historical case studies, and wargames
against an active Red team to gain practical experience. This study demonstrates the
potential for comparing different levels of centralizing command and control in the
course of conducting these wargames, to provide future practitioners with a workinglevel understanding of the pros and cons of decentralizing airpower C2.
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Recommendations for research methodology. A potential area for further
study of research methodology would involve an in-depth analysis of the normalization
technique developed as an expedient for this study. In the present study, the normalized
outcome was computed by expressing the result as a mean percentage of centralized
control advantage or disadvantage compared to decentralized control. The resulting
distribution, obtained by multiplying each data point of normally distributed data by a
constant, retained the properties of normality (Wolfram, 2018). Additional research
could examine the mathematical foundations for various approaches to normalizing the
data to enable comparisons across different levels of an independent categorical variable.
Recommendations for future research. Additional research could investigate
assertions in Hinote (2009), Betts (2014), or Hukill et al. (2012) that were not addressed
in this research; summaries of their key variables can be found in Figures 12, 13, and 14.
For example, Betts surmised that the degree of trust between the C2 headquarters and the
operational units could influence the centralization-decentralization balance; follow-on
research could examine decentralization schemes that trade increased trust for the loss in
efficiency. This and similar such research could establish corresponding operational
conditions for evaluation using the methodology in this research effort.
Future studies can build on the framework established in this study, generating
additional hypotheses to be tested and pushing the boundaries established by the
assumptions, limitations, and delimitations in this study. Researchers analyzing C2
resiliency schemes could use this framework for assessing relative effectiveness of
decentralization schemes. Consider, for example a new hypothesis, labeled Hypothesis 4,
testing the inverse of H2a, asserting that the mean difference between outcomes under
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centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control will increase as the number
of Blue assets decreases in a complex scenario. This hypothesis asserts that as Blue
assets become scarcer, centralized control will have an increasing advantage over
decentralized control. This hypothesis could be tested using JAEX, expanding the Blue
and Red air, space, and cyberspace inventories and bases, and modeling a large-scale
conventional conflict under centralized and decentralized control assumptions.
As an example, refer to Figure 43, depicting a complex scenario in which both
Blue and Red forces possess myriad offensive and defensive air, space, and cyberspace
capabilities. Under centralized control, airpower is orchestrated from a single Combined
Air Operations Center. However, command and control could be forced to devolve
temporarily to a decentralized, sector-based scheme, as was planned for in NATO’s early
years for political, technological, and resiliency reasons (Rifenburg, 1989).
During the Cold War, the Central Region of Europe included four Sector
Operations Centers and associated Allied Tactical Operations Centers which could
operate independently for defensive and offensive operations within their assigned
geographic sectors. This arrangement was criticized for the challenges created by the
various C2 agencies involved in prosecuting air operations, yet, as Rifenburg noted at the
time, “the numbers of C2 facilities certainly make the enemy’s targeting problem more
complex” (p. 20).
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Figure 43. Blue vs. Red Central Europe scenario depicting decentralized target sectors.
From: John Tiller Software, Inc., used with permission.

Hypothesis 4 analyzes the Blue force structure for each of three operational Blue
asset condition levels: a baseline inventory, 75% inventory, and 50% inventory. Each
level was modeled in 1,000 iterations of the JAEX model. Figure 44 shows the outcome
difference histograms for the three levels, which are visually verified to be near-normal.
Figure 45 depicts the estimated marginal means at each level with 95% confidence
intervals, showing the increase in mean outcome differences as the Blue force structure
decreases is not monotonical.
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Figure 44. Histograms for H4 outcome differences for the three Blue inventory levels.

Figure 45. Estimated marginal means for absolute outcome differences under H4. Error
bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for the means.
After applying the normalization technique outlined earlier, Figure 46 shows the
histograms of mean centralized control advantage are near-normal. Figure 47 shows the
normalized data support the alternative hypothesis that centralization has an increased
advantage over decentralization as assets become scarcer. For the H4 modeled scenario,
the mean centralized control outcome provided an approximate 13% advantage over
decentralized control when the number of assets was reduced by half. However, an
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unexpected finding, and area warranting further analysis, was that the rate of increase in
the outcome difference when assets were reduced from 1.0 level to 0.75 (0% to 11%)
tapered off as the assets were cut from 0.75 level to 0.50 level (11% to 13%). It was
expected that as assets become scarcer, the slope of the marginal means (Figure 47)
would increase.

Figure 46. Histograms for H4 normalized outcome differences for the three Blue
inventory levels.

Figure 47. Estimated marginal means for normalized outcome differences under H4.
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Summary
Successful scientific research often benefits from a foundation of qualitative
research in accomplishing quantitative evaluations (Simpson, 2015, p. 193). The study’s
results provide quantitative support to assertions regarding decentralization made by
previous researchers, including Hinote (2009), Hukill et al. (2012), and Betts (2014).
The methodology used in this research, in which outcomes under centralized
control were contrasted with outcomes under decentralized control for the same starting
conditions, provides a framework for further assessments of the impact of decentralizing
airpower C2. The study succeeded in quantifying the relationships between C2 structures
and operational conditions for specified initial conditions. Future research could use
different models and assess different operational conditions to gain a deeper
understanding of the tradeoffs involved in developing resilient, appropriately centralized
or decentralized approaches to airpower command and control.
Per joint doctrine, commanders are responsible for designing and implementing
appropriate C2 structures (Joint Publication 3-30, 2014); this study can provide input into
the various factors that commanders consider in this process. For those practitioners
predisposed to favor centralization, the study shows that there are circumstances in which
decentralized control can be as effective, or more effective, than centralized control. For
those predisposed to favor decentralized control, the study shows there are conditions
under which centralization provides potentially significant increases in airpower’s overall
effectiveness.
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APPENDIX A
Description of the JAEX Model
This appendix describes JAEX, the airpower model used as the data generation
and collection apparatus for this research. JAEX is a hexagon-based wargaming model.
Figure A1 displays a notional JAEX screenshot. Each JAEX hexagon represent
approximately 50 nautical miles of terrain and airspace.

Figure A1. Notional JAEX screenshot. (Tiller, 2017b)
Each run of the JAEX model produces a numerical outcome score based on two
types of attrition: ground assets and air assets. Each friendly and enemy air and surface
asset has assigned characteristics maintained in an asset database, as shown in Figure A2.
Each asset has an assigned value, with high-value assets being assigned a relatively high
numerical value in the model. Strikes against ground targets produce scores based on the
level of damage and the value of the target. Air attrition produces scores based on the
value of the asset destroyed. Each attack has a given probability of success; the overall
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outcome is computed based on a sum of the attritional outcomes. Positive outcomes
indicate Blue advantage, while negative outcomes indicate Red advantage.

Figure A2. Screenshot of JAEX asset database.
The numerical outcome of each model run constitutes the unit of analysis for this
research effort. JAEX is a stochastic model; hence, multiple runs of the model under the
same conditions will generate a distribution of results. The results of multiple computer
runs, aggregated into bins, generate a histogram depicting the distribution of outcomes,
such as that as shown in Figure A3.

Figure A3. Histogram with Gaussian curve fitting (Tiller, 2017b).
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APPENDIX B
Difference of Two Normal Distributions
This research focused on the difference between outcomes under centralized
control and outcomes under decentralized control. A relevant mathematical result stems
from the observation that the difference between two normally distributed random
variables X and Y, with means and variances (µ x, σ2x) and (µy, σ2y), respectively, is given
by (Weisstein, 2018):
(1)

(2)

where δ(x) is a delta function, which is normally distributed with mean
(3)

and variance
(4)

Thus, the difference between normally distributed centralized and normally
distributed decentralized C2 outcomes will also be normally distributed, albeit with a
variance that equals the sum of the two distribution’s variances. This property enabled
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statistical comparison of the difference between centralized and decentralized outcomes
using tests requiring normally distributed populations.
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APPENDIX C
Histograms and P-P Plots
The tests used in this research were parametric, requiring the data to be
approximately normally distributed (De Veaux, Velleman, & Bock, 2012, p. 129-130).
This appendix includes the histograms of the centralized – decentralized outcome
differences computed based on JAEX model runs, with normal distribution plots
overlaid. The probability-probability plots (P-P) are also presented, in which the z-scores
of the data points were plotted against the values that would have been expected for a
normal distribution (De Veaux, Velleman, & Bock, 2012, p. 129-130; Field, 2009, p.
147-148; Laerd, 2018). Near-normality of the data is one assumption required for
ANOVA tests; the visualizations in this appendix assisted in assessing this condition.
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Figure C1. Histogram of H1 uncontested near outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C2. Normal P-P plot of H1 uncontested near outcome difference.
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Figure C3. Histogram of H1 Uncontested mid outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.
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Figure C4. Normal P-P plot of H1 uncontested mid outcome difference.
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Figure C5. Histogram of H1 uncontested far outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C6. Normal P-P plot of H1 uncontested far outcome difference.
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Figure C7. Histogram of H1 contested near outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C8. Normal P-P plot of H1 contested near outcome difference.
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Figure C9. Histogram of H1 contested near outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C10. Normal P-P plot of H1 contested mid outcome difference.
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Figure C11. Histogram of H1 contested far outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C12. Normal P-P plot of H1 contested far outcome difference.
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Figure C13. Histogram of H2a uncontested 1.0 outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C14. Normal P-P plot of H2a uncontested 1.0 outcome difference.
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Figure C15. Histogram of H2a uncontested 1.5 outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C16. Normal P-P plot of H2a uncontested 1.5 outcome difference.
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Figure C17. Histogram of H2a uncontested 2.0 outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C18. Normal P-P plot of H2a uncontested 2.0 outcome difference.
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Figure C19. Histogram of H2a contested 1.0 outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C20. Normal P-P plot of H2a contested 1.0 outcome difference.
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Figure C21. Histogram of H2a contested 1.5 outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C22. Normal P-P plot of H2a contested 1.5 outcome difference.
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Figure C23. Histogram of H2a contested 2.0 outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C24. Normal P-P plot of H2a contested 2.0 outcome difference.
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Figure C25. Histogram of H2b uncontested Quality-E outcome difference data with
normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C26. Normal P-P plot of H2b contested Quality-E outcome difference.
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Figure C27. Histogram of H2b uncontested Quality-C outcome difference data with
normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C28. Normal P-P plot of H2b uncontested Quality-C outcome difference.
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Figure C29. Histogram of H2b uncontested Quality-A outcome difference data with
normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C30. Normal P-P plot of H2b uncontested Quality-A outcome difference.
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Figure C31. Histogram of H2b contested Quality-E outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C32. Normal P-P plot of H2b contested Quality-E outcome difference.
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Figure C33. Histogram of H2b contested Quality-C outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C34. Normal P-P plot of H2b contested Quality-C outcome difference.
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Figure C35. Histogram of H2b contested Quality-A outcome difference data with
normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C36. Normal P-P plot of H2b contested Quality-A outcome difference.
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Figure C37. Histogram of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-E outcome difference
data with normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C38. Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-E outcome
difference.
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Figure C39. Histogram of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-C outcome difference
data with normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C40. Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-C outcome
difference.
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Figure C41. Histogram of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-A outcome difference
data with normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C42. Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-A outcome
difference.
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Figure C43. Histogram of H2b normalized contested Quality-E outcome difference data
with normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C44. Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized contested Quality-E outcome
difference.
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Figure C45. Histogram of H2b normalized contested Quality-C outcome difference data
with normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C46. Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized contested Quality-C outcome
difference.
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Figure C47. Histogram of H2b normalized contested Quality-A outcome difference data
with normal distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C48. Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized contested Quality-A outcome
difference.
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Figure C49. Histogram of H3 uncontested 100% outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C50. Normal P-P plot of H3 uncontested 100% outcome difference.
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Figure C51. Histogram of H3 uncontested 80% outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C52. Normal P-P plot of H3 uncontested 80% outcome difference.
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Figure C53. Histogram of H3 uncontested 60% outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C54. Normal P-P plot of H3 uncontested 60% outcome difference.
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Figure C55. Histogram of H3 uncontested 40% outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C56. Normal P-P plot of H3 uncontested 40% outcome difference.
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Figure C57. Histogram of H3 contested 100% outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C58. Normal P-P plot of H3 contested 100% outcome difference.
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Figure C59. Histogram of H3 contested 80% outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C60. Normal P-P plot of H3 contested 80% outcome difference.
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Figure C61. Histogram of H3 contested 60% outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C62. Normal P-P plot of H3 contested 60% outcome difference.
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Figure C63. Histogram of H3 contested 40% outcome difference data with normal
distribution plot overlaid.

Figure C64. Normal P-P plot of H3 contested 40% outcome difference.

